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 5 
Paul Hillmer and Vint Lawrence outside the home in Norfolk, CT Lawrence shares with wife Anne Garrels 6 
 7 
Born in New York City to what he describes as “a very privileged childhood…in every possible way,” J. Vinton 8 
(“Vint”) Lawrence attended Phillips Exeter Academy and Princeton University.  Recruited by the CIA, he was sent 9 
to Laos in the very early days of “Operation Momentum,” the campaign to train and arm the Hmong to fight against 10 
Communist forces.  Arriving in Laos in February 1962, Lawrence was sized up by Bill Lair, worked under Lair’s 11 
lieutenant Pat Landry to train some of the first groups of Hmong soldiers, and ultimately became one of only two CIA 12 
operatives (along with the infamous Anthony Poshepny, a.k.a. Tony Poe) to remain behind in Laos once the 1962 13 
Geneva Accords were put in force.  He lived with General Vang Pao, serving as a constant companion and sounding 14 
board.  (As Roger Warner has written, Vang Pao considered Bill Lair an older brother and Vint Lawrence a 15 
younger one.)  Living in a jungle in isolation from the outside world for nearly two years, Lawrence in many ways 16 
served as the conduit between the Hmong and the US.  Given the amount of time he spent with them, Lawrence 17 
became an amateur anthropologist and folklorist, asking numerous Hmong leaders and villagers to help him 18 
understand their culture.  After two tours in Laos, Lawrence was told he would not be allowed to return for a third (to 19 
save him from being killed or “going native”—that is, so sympathizing with the Hmong that he might never return).  20 
After a short period working first for William Colby and then Paul Nitze, Lawrence opted for a civilian life and has 21 
never looked back, unless to assist authors like Roger Warner, Keith Quincy, or Zalin Grant. 22 
 23 
 24 
(0:00)  Well, it’s the 17th of June— 25 
July, actually. 26 
July.  (That’s how quickly the summer’s going for me.)  I am the very happy guest of Mr. J. 27 
Vinton Lawrence.  We’re here today to talk about a wide variety of things, but mostly those 28 
related to his time in Laos. 29 
 30 
[Interviewer puts recorder in front of Mr. Lawrence] 31 
 32 
(0:21)  Let’s just start with some basic information.  Where were you born, and what do you 33 
remember about your childhood, your family life, that may be of interest? 34 
I was born in New York City, spent my childhood either in New York or out in New Jersey when 35 
the apartment got too small for six kids.  This place in Norfolk, Connecticut has been my spiritual 36 
home, and now my physical home for a number of years.  We always used to come up here in the 37 
summer.  And my wife and I moved up here, more or less full time, about ten years ago.  And I’ve 38 
been delighted to be here.  Childhood was… [Pauses] I think in every possible way it was a very 39 
privileged childhood.  I had good parents, I went to very good schools, and I [Pauses] really never 40 
worried the way most kids have to worry about certain things.  So in that sense I was extraordinarily 41 
lucky.  I went to a good boarding school in New England, Phillips Exeter Academy, and I went to 42 
Princeton University, where I majored in Art History, and did a lot of sports and theatrical stuff.  43 
And when it came time to graduate, just shortly before that, I had been in ROTC—this was in late 44 
1960—’59 or ’60. So I had a three-year military ob—I had a two-year military obligation, I guess, as 45 
an active junior officer.  And the Dean of Students called me into his office and [asked if I might 46 
want to] serve my country in a different way, and I—my father had been in OSS during World War 47 
II, so I knew something about the Agency, and— 48 
 49 
(2:42)  He had told you stories? 50 
No.  My father, by and large, told very few stories.  But it was nonetheless a romantic image that I 51 
probably supplied mostly by myself.  But I thought it was sort of a feather in my cap to be, in effect, 52 
tapped by the Dean of Students, who was, I think, probably nothing more than an agency spotter, 53 
basically.  I mean, I think he got ahold of 15 or 20 in his graduating class who he thought would 54 
make good officers, and I was one of them. 55 
 56 
[Interview double-checks to make sure recorder is on] 57 
 58 
So I went through all the training and all that sort of business, and came out the other side.  And it 59 
was all kind of, for the most part, great fun, and interesting work.  And I was very interested in 60 
China.  And at the end of our training we had to go through paramilitary training, because, of 61 
course, the Bay of Pigs had just happened.  [Pauses, takes a sip of a drink]  I was set probably to go 62 
to North India to help what was left of the Tibetan resistance.  And I bought all my high-weather 63 
gear, [Interviewer laughs] and then all of a sudden there was a meeting—I was called into a meeting, 64 
and they said, ‘Well, no, you’re going to go to Laos.’ 65 
 66 
(4:34)  They didn’t make any explanation for why— 67 
No, it was just—well, I think it was because the stuff going on in Laos had all of a sudden become 68 
more… [Pauses]  Kennedy was very interested in Laos, he was very interested in counter-insurgency 69 
or insurgency warfare, the Agency saw this as an opportunity—the connection with Vang Pao had 70 
been recently made, and they needed bodies, and I was a body.  So I arrive in Vientiane, slightly 71 
little—my 22nd year—21st year, actually—22nd, I guess I was 22.  And I spoke some French, I was 72 
not married, I didn’t have any dependents, and so I was the guy who was sent up-country to talk to 73 
the French-speaking Hmong.  I did not speak, obviously had absolutely no language training, no 74 
nothing.  I knew nothing about Laos. 75 
 76 
(5:40)  I’m curious…Did you ever hear the word ‘Hmong’— 77 
No. 78 
—when you were in Laos? 79 
No.  This is a culturally-imposed re-naming of the Meo tribesman. 80 
Dr. Gary Yia Lee is the fellow in Australia who helped me put my trip together, and he was a 81 
student of William Geddes— 82 
Yes. 83 
—who was one of the first people to write about [the Hmong]—Migrants of the Mountains, 84 
I think— 85 
Something like that, yes. 86 
And he told [Geddes when he read a draft of his book], ‘We hate to be called Meo.’  But 87 
[there was] absolutely no evidence of that from your experience when you were in Laos? 88 
Well, you know that’s interesting.  Certainly… [Pauses] I assumed that they hated to be called Meo 89 
largely because it was the Lao, the lowland Lao, who used that term, [Pauses] who used the term 90 
derisively.  If you use the term with obvious respect, I never—I was never physically corrected by 91 
Vang Pao or anyone else who said, ‘You know, we really don’t like that.  It was only— 92 
 93 
[Mr. Lawrence’s coffee brewer needs attention.  Recorder stops, new track begins] 94 
 95 
(0:07)  And I cannot remember whether I changed my use before I left or not. 96 
 97 
(0:19)  If you don’t mind me backing up (as I said, I’m a stickler for silly little questions…)  98 
If you think of yourself as a young man going through high school and college, how much, 99 
if at all, do you see yourself as a product of the Cold War and this idea that America must 100 
protect itself against all enemies foreign and domestic? 101 
[Pauses]  That’s a good question.  I certainly think I was a product of the Cold, War, and I certainly 102 
think the language and the discussions that I tended to hear around— 103 
 104 
[Mr. Lawrence asks if the noise of the coffee brewing is too loud.  Interviewer says no.] 105 
 106 
The conversations usually, [Pauses] when they were being held by people who wanted to pretend 107 
they were extremely educated, [Interviewer laughs] those conversations tended to focus more on 108 
sort of global arrangements and global conflicts, and so I grew up with the language of an affluent, 109 
intellectual family to which those kinds of arguments came rather easily.  So in that sense I was 110 
[Pauses] I think I was probably imbued with that, and it was the four years in Laos that just 111 
disabused me of it rather substantially. 112 
 113 
(2:07)  Could you talk a bit about reporting to duty to wherever CIA headquarters was at the 114 
time, and…about some of the training that you received during that period before you went 115 
to Laos? 116 
The CIA headquarters when I first get there in the early 1960s, I guess in the fall of 1960, were in 117 
the temporary buildings down by the reflecting pool.  They were old World War II naval buildings 118 
that were built in a temporary—and then just kept on. It was a very ramshackle affair, and then, of 119 
course, during the four years I was overseas, when I came back, we’re in Langley, that new complex 120 
is built.  [Pauses]  Yes, my training was pretty much standard.  I was a junior officer trainee, which is 121 
known as a JOT, and we spent a great deal of time at the agency installation near Williamsburg, 122 
Virginia, which is known as the farm. 123 
Fort Peary, was it? 124 
What?  Camp Peary, Camp Peary.  We did all our foreign intel—we went through our foreign 125 
intelligence course there, which was fascinating work.  I mean, it was fascinating.  It was a… 126 
[Pauses] somebody with made-up countries and made-up political situations, and you would do your 127 
trade craft with the instructors.  And we all thought, as a JO class, we were pretty smart.  128 
[Interviewer laughs] And so there was this certain—there was a huge amount of intellectual 129 
arrogance involved. I don’t know how many of the 45 or 50 guys who were in my class ever stuck it 130 
out.  Not very—I would say under—probably less than 10%.  Maybe more than that, 20%.  Not 131 
very many.  Many of them just did it for a while and then left the Agency.  That course, as I 132 
remember, sort of started (I don’t know)—the better part of a year, I think.  And then after that, 133 
there was a requirement, because of the Bay of Pigs, that all physically capable officers had to go 134 
through paramilitary training.  So that took me through the better part of 1961. 135 
 136 
(4:52)  So—I’m sorry, I have no military experience—so paramilitary training involves, I 137 
assume, jump school… 138 
Jump school, and it involved—it wasn’t like Special Forces training; you weren’t being taught 139 
specifically to fight.  We weren’t being taught to fight the way a Special Forces unit is taught.  It 140 
was—the idea was familiarization with the terminologies and the tactics and some of the processes 141 
so that if you got into a situation you could be an advisor to or at least a window on other local 142 
people who are actually doing the fighting.  And certainly, during the whole period I was in Laos, I 143 
was often admonished that I was not there to actually pull triggers and become a hero.  I was there 144 
basically to help them—help the people that were doing the fighting do what they were supposed to 145 
be doing.  So that’s—so in that sense it was a broad exposure to various things of, various forms of 146 
military procedure. 147 
 148 
(6:16)  Before you left and arrived—first in Bangkok, right, and then in Vientiane after 149 
that—how much time did you have to sort of bone up on Laos in general and the Hmong 150 
specifically? 151 
[Laughs] A week? 152 
Oh my.  And this was— 153 
First of all, you have to—you know, 1960, if you went to any kind of archive and looked up Laos, 154 
you got two books, if you were lucky.  And you got no—there were some, it turned out later that 155 
there were some Ph.D. dissertations on the Hmong, largely from one fellow (I’ll see if I can find…) 156 
who I think did it mostly in Thailand.  But there really was absolutely no—there was no archival 157 
material whatsoever, to speak of, and there were some very—you really had to read it in French if 158 
you were going to spend any time to—and I assume that there was good French archival material, 159 
but I just couldn’t get my hands on it, and I didn’t have the time. 160 
 161 
(7:34)  And this wasn’t an era (maybe it still isn’t an era, for all I know) in which the CIA 162 
thought, ‘Well, of course, in order to work effectively this person needs to know something 163 
about this culture, these people’… 164 
Yeah, well this is… [Both laugh]  I’m sure they’re better.  [Interviewer laughs]  How could they be 165 
worse?—let’s put it that way.  I mean, it was just a forgotten country then, and I would suspect that, 166 
to some degree, it still is.  But no, there was no—I remember the Agency had almost—at least what 167 
I could read and I could get was very marginal at best 168 
 169 
(8:18)  So, if you don’t mind, talk about Vientiane as you remember it when you arrived. 170 
Well, [Pauses] the interesting thing about Vientiane and what happened when I left four years later 171 
was the—and that’s what made our visit back there in 1999 so bizarrely interesting was that on the 172 
short list of an incompetent socialist/communist regime is that nothing gets done.  And so 173 
Vientiane, [Pauses] always susceptible of being a time warp to begin with, in the last 30 years is 174 
virtually unchanged from what it was when I first went there—streets unpaved, the promenade by 175 
the Mekong River which was started in 1958 remained [Interviewer gasps]—you know, nothing ever 176 
happened.  So it was—I enjoyed it.  I didn’t spend much time in Vientiane, because I very quickly—177 
I mean, I guess I got there in [Pauses to remember] mid-summer, maybe, late summer—no even 178 
earlier than that.  Oh, I got there in February 1962.  And I started going up country a lot by 179 
summertime.  And of course part—then I became rather infamous because I was the long-time 180 
record-holder for the longest tapeworm that had ever been on display at the embassy dispensary.  It 181 
was over—stretched out it was over 22 feet long.  And I reeled it out of my rear end one night and I 182 
thought I was dying.  So I was a very sick puppy for a while.  But anyway, I got upcountry… [Both 183 
laugh] 184 
 185 
(10:26)  More on that later!  [Laughs] 186 
I got up country almost full-time by the late summer, and then by the fall we were [Pauses] looking 187 
around for a permanent base, and that’s when I got to Long Cheng.  And when I get to Long Cheng 188 
some time in September, there are 14 people in the valley.  It’s gorgeous.  But then I—once the 189 
Geneva Conventions were signed, I believe in September of ’62, I was in there black [under cover].  190 
I mean, I wasn’t supposed to be there, and I was theoretically working for an airline, and they just 191 
left us up there for about six months before they even tried to get us out for some R & R, which 192 
consisted of a night in Udorn. So I never went—see, my sense of Vientiane is—I really, by the time 193 
I leave four years later, I had seen New York more recently than I had seen Vientiane, because I was 194 
theoretically not in the country.  And then when I go—so I get to go back one night four years later, 195 
and then come back to Vientiane 30 years later, and as far as I can see, it’s just this wonderful, sleepy 196 
little colonial city on the Mekong River, and it’s really quite unchanged. 197 
 198 
(12:11)  Was there much in the way of electricity or running water or… 199 
There was running water—the French had done that—and there was a power grid of some form.  I 200 
can’t remember [Pauses]—gee, I just assumed that it worked pretty much all day long but I never—201 
and I’m sure there were districts on the outskirts of Vientiane that got spotty coverage, but I—the 202 
Agency had a house that I lived in, and then it had a complex out near the airport, and I lived in a 203 
house for about two or three months with a pilot named Bill Andresevic, and Bill Lair across the 204 
street, so there was sort of a Hmong, there a was road that was known as Meo Alley, or something 205 
like that. 206 
 207 
(13:07)  So you had to come in with some kind of cover, since you were CIA. 208 
I came in as a military officer, because I was a military officer.  I was assigned to a military 209 
assistance—a MAAG group—Military Assistance Advisory Group, and then, when September ’62 210 
coincided with the two years of my active duty.   So I then went home.  You couldn’t resign your 211 
commission out of country; you had to be in country to do that.  So I came— literally I was flown 212 
home for a weekend, where I signed papers saying I resigned my commission.  And then I was 213 
flown back, and then I became an employee of Bird and Son, and had that useful piece of paper in 214 
my pocket if anything should happen, and I went back up country— 215 
Oh, the blood chit? 216 
No, no, I just had a little piece of laminated plastic and a picture saying I was an employee of Bird 217 
and Son.  So, to the extent one had a cover it was very light; to the extent that it meant anything it 218 
was inconsequential.  Everyone knew who I was, everyone knew what I was doing, and they may 219 
not have gotten all the fine points, but basically I was—what did they call us?  They called us Sky—a 220 
Sky Team.  And so it was loose enough so that a lot of USAID guys sort of snuck in underneath it, 221 
and Pop Buell, who was quite a famous name, loved to pretend to people that he was actually a CIA 222 
operative. [Interviewer laughs]   So I guess—you know, you had to do something for humor out 223 
there. 224 
 225 
(15:27)  Sure.  I’m probably getting ahead of myself a little bit, because this is obviously 226 
something that persisted during your tour of duty and well beyond, but there were so many 227 
layers in this chain of command, for lack of a better descriptor.  I mean, you had the 228 
embassy, you had the President and the State Department, you had the CIA...  During your 229 
years there, how did you see those different facets of the entities that represented the United 230 
States and American interests interact with each other or come into conflict with each other? 231 
Well, it’s an interesting question, because I think… [Pauses]  I have a certain bias, and you might as 232 
well know the bias right up [front].  I believe that the project was viable as a project, as long as we 233 
didn’t push the Hmong out on a limb to fight a war they were unprepared to fight, even though they 234 
wanted, they wanted the bells and whistles that were involved in getting made a more conventional 235 
force.  I spent four years very hard trying to connect the Hmong and Vang Pao in particular, to an 236 
overarching symbol of Lao—‘Laotion-ness,’ if you will, which, at that point, the King was the only 237 
institution—the royalty was the only institution that could serve that purpose.  So I saw my job as:  238 
one, to keep any aspirations of Hmong autonomy at bay; two, to do all that I could to bypass the 239 
Laotian political—the venal political system as it existed in Vientiane; and to connect Vang Pao to 240 
the King, because I felt that was the only way that they would survive in a long term, and that we 241 
Americans should do nothing to make that, their connection to the King more tenuous, and that we 242 
should keep a lid on the more adventuresome or heroic Hmong officers who wanted Air Forces and 243 
conventional weapons and—there was a huge force [push] to make them a conventional force.  My 244 
departure four years later coincided—so going back, this whole thing worked, and the layers that 245 
you asked me about worked as long as the Agency and the State Department agreed that this was 246 
the proper role.  And for a good part of the time I was there, there was an ambassador named 247 
William Sullivan, and Sullivan and I saw absolutely eye to eye on this.  This is what he wanted.  He 248 
didn’t want to see northern Laos become an adjunct of Saigon and the military in Saigon.  He 249 
thought that there was a role for the State Department and the Agency to play, and indeed I thought 250 
there was.  When I left, as I have said on some occasions, I was—things had been going badly in 251 
Vietnam, and the push by the southern, by the military in Vietnam finally won, and they flooded the 252 
place with American soldiers and officers and training teams and this.  And I like to think—I said I 253 
was replaced by 500 Americans, and in fact I pretty much was.  And I think that was a disaster.  254 
Because that did was—I ate, slept, and worked for four years with Vang Pao.  I went with him 255 
everywhere, he talked to me every day.  I knew the man and I knew the people.  I didn’t have any 256 
American friends.  The only person I had up there was a guy named Tony Poe.  Tony and I didn’t 257 
see eye to eye.  Tony didn’t like me particularly.  I was a young upstart, I did all the writing, I was not 258 
a warrior, Tony was.  Tony subsequently—Bill Lair, in a very good, judicious move, got Tony his 259 
own little bailiwick up in the northwest.  I think Tony was delighted to see the end of me.  260 
[Interviewer chuckles]  How long it could have lasted in this sort of earlier form I don’t know, but I 261 
think the end of the Hmong was absolutely written in stone the day they decided to take back the 262 
Plaines de Jarres, they got air cover, they got—you know, they just got excited about what they 263 
could do, and I think that was probably the worst thing we could have done. 264 
 265 
[Mr. Lawrence gets some coffee, recorder is turned off, new track begins] 266 
 267 
(0:03)  Chiefs of station, who would come in and try to add a layer, layers upon layers 268 
between…[Pauses]  I’m thinking particularly of Douglas Blaufarb, who turned out to be one of our 269 
strongest supporters, I think, toward the end, but he started out being one of our most severe critics, 270 
and I think generally speaking, the project turned out to be larger than any one individual’s effort to 271 
impose a certain kind of structure to it—other than what it had.  272 
 273 
(0:52)  Was there discussion, during your tenure already—I seem to recall reading 274 
somewhere that someone back in the States had run some kind of simulation—but was 275 
there talk about moving the Hmong people to Sayaboury province…in your sphere? 276 
[Pauses]  I’m sure there was.  I don’t have a specific memory of sitting down with anybody in the 277 
four years—because basically, in the four years, anybody who came out from Washington was 278 
simply—usually pretty impressed by what he or she saw.  I am sure someone said, ‘Well now what 279 
happens if it all goes south?  Where do they go?  What do they do?’—yadda yadda yadda.  The 280 
problem of Sayaboury as a province is it tends to be lower than the existing—where they lived for 281 
the most part.  It tended, it would be further away from the Hmong homeland of Nong Het, up 282 
very close to the Vietnamese border.  A lot of these folks fought largely in order to return one day 283 
going east.  If you went to Sayaboury you were getting further west.  You also had to cross the 284 
Mekong River plain.  You also had the issue of—which, of course, subsequently killed so many of 285 
them, of malaria when they went across the river.  These guys just didn’t have that kind of immunity 286 
in their system.  So I’m sure there was talk.  Of course, western Sayaboury province starts to climb 287 
toward the borders of Thailand, which is where there were Hmong.  But I don’t recall a serious talk.  288 
I mean, I was always being asked all kinds of things by Washington, such as having—they were 289 
much more concerned about opium trade than they were ultimate escape routes and things like that. 290 
 291 
(3:14)  Well, this may not be an apt title—perhaps you can tell me if this is a good 292 
appellation to use or not, but I think of them as the two founding fathers of this operation.  293 
One is obviously Bill Lair— 294 
Yes. 295 
—and the other is Pop Buell, at least in terms of the USAID side of things. 296 
[Yes.] 297 
What do you remember about your first encounter with Bill Lair, and how soon and to what 298 
degree were you told about the various intricacies of Operation Momentum? 299 
What’s Operation Momentum? 300 
Oh!  It’s basically the plan to arm and use the Hmong—sorry. 301 
[Both laugh]  See, I don’t even know what the… 302 
To you it was just your job. 303 
It was just my job.  [Interviewer chuckles]  I met Bill Lair right off the bat, in February 1962.  He 304 
and his deputy Pat Landry became very—I think very good friends of mine.  Somehow I think they 305 
liked me.  I don’t know—I mean, they certainly gave me the job that everyone else envied.  As I 306 
said, I think it had largely to do with the fact that I was not married, I had no children, I had no 307 
dependents, I was—and I spoke French, to a certain degree.  So I would—I spent a lot of time with 308 
Lair in the early months where he—and we talked about that earlier where he talked about his life as 309 
a young officer having his bride picked out for him [by the CIA].  And we talked a lot about his early 310 
formation of the PARU [in Thailand], which was—which all of this could not have happened 311 
without that asset in place.  I mean, it is something which—I just don’t think any of this would have 312 
occurred if the PARU had not been able to go in and quietly become our surrogates with the local 313 
population.  They spoke the language to a great degree.  And it was that whole group of the Police 314 
Aerial Rescue [Re-supply] Unit, or whatever it was called, that made this whole thing fly.  So Bill was 315 
very proud of it, as I think he should have been, because I think it was a—and Bill very quickly, to 316 
me, became a paragon of how a secret service should operate. 317 
 318 
(5:52)  How so? 319 
You take a man or woman, you let—you put him into—the Brits would put him into deep cover 320 
and send him over to a country where he spends the next five to 10 years establishing his 321 
credentials.  But you leave that person in country.  You don’t rotate them out for bureaucratic 322 
promotional reasons.  And Bill found in the Thai, a country and a people that he truly loved, and I 323 
think he turned down any efforts to move him on to go to this training or that training.  He wanted 324 
to stay in Thailand.  And to somebody’s great credit, they let him stay.  And as far as I know, he’s 325 
the only one who I think ever did that.  (I’m sure there are other instances that I just don’t know of.)  326 
But it seemed to me that if you wanted a model of how you gain the trust of a host country, this is a 327 
pretty good model.  And I think there is no question that Bill, to this day, is honored by Thais of 328 
every stripe.  And it’s sort of ridiculous that you—that here you have a model of how to do it, and 329 
yet it’s never been done again, as far as I know. [Pauses]   Bill taught me a great deal about Thais and 330 
about life and about growing up, and he was very much an older brother to me.  And I was 331 
enormously fond of him—still am, and enormously respectful.  I was also fortunate in that, for 332 
about a year and for almost the entire time I was there, I did all of Pop Buell’s work.  [Interviewer 333 
guffaws] 334 
 335 
(8:15)  Well, talk some more about that.  [Chuckling] 336 
Pop I loved.  He was a real character.  But Pop—I ran Pop’s—all his air drops, I ran all his logistical 337 
support units.  He was in Sam Thong, I was 12 miles away in Long Cheng, and Pop and I spent a 338 
whole lot of time together.  Again, I liked him, he liked me.  I worked my ass off for Pop.  And I let 339 
Pop be Pop, in effect. 340 
 341 
(8:56)  What do you mean by that? 342 
Well, Pop was a great—Pop was a bullshitter.  But he was a good bullshitter.  I mean, I’m not—he 343 
was a great ‘press the flesh’ guy, and he was a wonderful motivator of civic behavior.  He was hardly 344 
a detail man.  And in effect—and I wasn’t either, although I became a detail man, because that—in a 345 
way, curiously, my job for four years was to do the details.  So I did the details for him as I did for 346 
Bill.  And I think—I ran interference with him.  Charlie Mann, or somebody who was in charge of 347 
the AID mission would come up, and they would sit together and Charlie would talk to me, because 348 
basically I knew where everything was going and I knew what was going on.  And Pop would rant 349 
and rave about this.  [Pauses]  He also had some cute nurses, [Interviewer laughs] which I didn’t 350 
[Laughs]—so I went to visit his nurses a couple of times—sort of.  But anyway, we got along very 351 
well.  And if Pop needed money or needed funding, because AID was very difficult for him to work, 352 
I would make sure—I would get him what he needed, by and large. 353 
 354 
(10:34)  I’ve got two or three different questions I need to…[Pauses]  I’d like to go back to 355 
Bill Lair for a second.  If I’ve heard the story correctly—you talked about how you were 356 
replaced by 500 men.  In a way, did, at least initially, Bill Lair see you as someone that he 357 
hadn’t asked for, that he wasn’t really sure he knew what to do with, and— 358 
Absolutely.  He didn’t know what the fuck I was. You know, I was some little Eastern twit—you 359 
know, majored in art history and spoke with an accent.  I’m sure…[Chuckles]  Both Bill and Pat 360 
[Landry] were Texas A & M guys.  I’m sure—it took quite a while for them to understand maybe 361 
that I wasn’t such a—I wasn’t maybe as bad as I appeared. [Interviewer chuckles]  Yeah, I think 362 
Bill—I’m sure Bill asked for help, ‘cause I’m sure he said, ‘This thing is growing, we need’—and I 363 
suspect Bill wanted junior people because he felt that he could mold junior minds better than he 364 
could old paramilitary minds who had their own ways of doing things.  An example, a little bit is 365 
Tony Poe.  I mean, if you talk about a warrior who had seen it all, Poe had done it all from being a 366 
Marine sapper in World War II, where he joins up—he lies about his age, he goes into the Marine 367 
Corps at the age of 16, into a unit where your casualty rates were up in the high 80s.  He then fights 368 
in Korea, he fights in Malaya, he fights in Indonesia and the Philippines—you know, Tony had—369 
and Tony was exceptional in that regard.  But I think the paramilitary bureaucracy of the Agency 370 
wanted to send out some of their old war horses who, probably Bill Lair—I would guess that Bill 371 
Lair didn’t want.  And I don’t know that for a fact. But in my dim memory, I think I remember him 372 
saying he liked to have people he could teach.  So he taught and I listened and I learned. 373 
 374 
(13:12)  I’m sure there are all sorts of things you could say, but if you were forced to come up 375 
with a ‘top however many you want to choose’ of big ideas or really helpful guiding 376 
principles that he passed on to you, what would those be? 377 
I think probably the best idea was that you don’t bring the last war into the current one.  And I think 378 
this is one of the things why he and I got along so well.  If you had to write one rule for why we 379 
were successful for as long as we were, it was that we followed no a priori guidelines, no a priori 380 
manual.  He was of the impression, I believe, that if you got smart people who would work hard, 381 
and loved what they were—the people they were working with, the answers would occur organically, 382 
if you will, and you would build a structure that was organic to the people you were working with, 383 
rather than imposing it hierarchically, from the top down.  And I think that was the one guiding 384 
principle that we worked on—that there was no manual, and the one person you didn’t want, 385 
however famous he was, was General Lansdale coming out and telling you how you ought to run an 386 
insurgency or counter-insurgency or guerilla operation, because the one thing that we both felt—and 387 
I don’t know if it came from me or it came from [Bill Lair or] it was symbiotic between us.  We 388 
understood that the process of getting someone to move from fighting to protect his family on one 389 
village on one hilltop was that you had to somehow take that initial desire, expand it so that person 390 
would be willing to fight for the village on the other, the opposing hilltop, with whom his village 391 
probably had a long-running feud.  So going back to what you were saying earlier about clans, you 392 
had to figure out how to expand someone’s consciousness so that they could indeed fight for a clan, 393 
perhaps that they had been feuding with for generations. 394 
 395 
(16:01)  And to build it on something other than the almost more Western idea of ‘the enemy 396 
of my enemy is my friend,’ to bind them together in some more meaningful way, I suppose. 397 
Yup, in that way, absolutely.  So you would try—you started very simply.  And that’s sort of in the 398 
film I made.  I tried to make that point. I did a film for the Agency. 399 
Oh, OK, I was not aware of that. 400 
Well then tonight you get to look at it.  [Interviewer sounds very pleased at the prospect]. You get to 401 
look at the film.  I have a purloined copy of that, too. [Interviewer laughs]  But now a lot of 402 
people—it’s out there.  But that was my point— 403 
 404 
(16:42)  This isn’t ‘Journey from Pha Dong’? 405 
Yeah. 406 
Oh, OK, I have seen that. 407 
You’ve seen it. 408 
I had no idea you were involved with that. 409 
I made it. 410 
I’ve used that in my classes. 411 
I wrote the script and I put the film together. 412 
Oh, my goodness!  Very—no, I had no idea.  Maybe that information isn’t out there to be 413 
found somewhere. 414 
I’m not in it.  The credit lines are not extensive, as you noticed.  No, but if you notice in the film, I 415 
try to get to the point where you talk about people coming in from various places to meet with Vang 416 
Pao, and how the genius of Vang Pao was that he would arm them and then he would [Pauses] give 417 
them a reason for fighting and also a reason for protecting their neighbors and their zone or their 418 
community—their larger community. 419 
 420 
(17:43)  Well this makes perfect sense now, because I saw this and I thought, ‘This is pretty 421 
perceptive culturally.  This is about telling people more than just, ‘These are good fighters.’  422 
I mean, there’s footage of a funeral, there’s footage of ball tossing, there’s all sorts of stuff in 423 
there. 424 
Yeah.  It’s a little purple. [Interviewer laughs]  I have a great friend.  He’s a historian at Princeton 425 
named Sean Wilentz. 426 
Oh, sure!  Of course! 427 
Sean’s a very good friend of mine, and actually his wife is a historian of the Progressive [Era], 428 
particularly of women. 429 
What’s her name? 430 
Christine Stansel.   Chris Stansel.  She’s also a professor at Princeton, and they come up here and 431 
spend time when they can, and I watched it with them last year or the year before.  And I was 432 
acutely embarrassed by my prose, which never would have flown by Sean, and is….  Anyway… 433 
 434 
(18:48)  Well, this was for a very different audience. 435 
Yeah, it was.  It was, and it served its purpose.  But what the point, though, is, is that—going back 436 
to that initial idea that you don’t have a manual.  It is very difficult to transpose the animating 437 
principle from Country X to Country Y—that you’re better off not even trying to do that.  I was 438 
better off, in effect, being untrained than if I had had in my mind a military concept, which is sort of 439 
what Special Forces or White Star or whatever you want to call them—how they operated, ‘cause 440 
they came in with a doctrine.  We had no doctrine; we made our doctrine up.  And I would be very 441 
loath to transpose that doctrine to, say, Iraq.  [Interviewer chuckles]  We sat—Annie [his wife Anne 442 
Garrels] and I sat here last summer with her driver [during her visits as an NPR correspondent to 443 
Iraq], who is in the book [Naked in Baghdad].  They call him ‘Amer.’  His real name is XXXX but 444 
XXXX is a Sunni Muslim, who lives—his family come from near XXXX.  And on his wall he can 445 
trace his family back roughly 800 years.  And to teach, to talk to XXXX about how they fight and 446 
what their customs are, is to listen to what would have been an articulate Hmong talking about how 447 
they fought, another words…[Pauses]  And I realize how XXXX and his family are going to survive 448 
this thing, if in fact they do, is going to be based on their animating principles, and nothing we can 449 
bring in to them.  So that was—I would say Bill Lair—and I don’t even know if Bill Lair said this to 450 
me, it’s just that [Pauses] we would talk.  We spent a lot of time talking and drinking together, and 451 
[Pauses] I would believe that—I’m sure he mentioned this, and I just expanded on it. 452 
 453 
(21:21)  Just one last question about ‘Journey from Pha Dong.’  Who would you say was the 454 
intended audience for that film?  I always imagined select members of the Senate Foreign 455 
Arms Committee or— 456 
Exactly.   457 
OK. 458 
Yeah.  It was made—it was made as a puff piece for the Agency, basically.  I mean, I came back 459 
from Laos, and I was supposed to go back for a third tour.  Bill Colby and Dick Helms got together, 460 
and each one claimed later on that they were responsible for not letting me go back.  So I’m going to 461 
give credit to both of them, thank their souls. 462 
 463 
(22:01)  So you think in the long run it was a very, very wise thing to get you out of there. 464 
Well, I think Colby said it very wisely.  He said, ‘My worry about you going back is that you’ll never 465 
come home.  You’ll either go native’—such as many [Pauses] there was a family by the name of Bill 466 
Young—sons of missionaries who—and maybe he was worried that I would become another Lair.  467 
I don’t know; he never said that, but—that I would go native, and I would become so invested in 468 
this program that nothing else would make any difference [or] sense to me—or that I’d get killed.  469 
And getting killed was—you know, you were flying every day—not killed in terms of a fire fight, but 470 
these little planes went down all the time, and you were flying in and out of landing strips that were 471 
truly hairy, and you did that on a daily basis, so at some point your string was going to run out.  So 472 
on that basis I think it was—and then I’m not sure he envisioned the career that I subsequently 473 
took, but…let’s just cover this.  So what he did, he said, ‘I want you to be my special assistant for a 474 
year, and I would like you to take all that footage that you and John Willheim produced, and make a 475 
film for us.’  And so I would work for Bill Lair [meant Colby] from eight to 12 in the mornings, and 476 
then John Willheim and I would go into some secure film lab down somewhere near the capital, and 477 
we would work on the film until all hours of the night.  John—we got along very well, and John was 478 
a superb photographer, and I wrote the story board and had it all out.  I’d never done this before, so 479 
here again, I’m just kind of winging it.  And then we presented it to the Director and the various 480 
heads.  And John had a marvelous wrinkle.  He said, ‘What we’re going to do is we’re going to 481 
misspell one word in the title when we show it to all of these cats, because they are all going to feel 482 
like they have to criticize something, so let’s give them the fuck-up right up front.  [Interviewer 483 
guffaws]  And it worked like a charm.  They all said, ‘Oh, boys, you kind of mis—and the only thing 484 
they said was, ‘You misspelled the title.’  [And we replied, ] ‘Oh!  I’m sorry!’ 485 
Unbelievable. 486 
And then I think it was subsequently shown—I don’t know where.  Defense Department, Pentagon, 487 
National Security Council, all that sort of stuff.  Yeah, as a film of that nature, some of it’s pretty 488 
good.  Some of it’s pretty tacky. 489 
 490 
(25:15)  I think for a period piece it holds up pretty well. 491 
Period piece—let’s call it that.  Period piece indeed.  So that was the story.  Oh, and then, just so you 492 
know [Pauses] I was walking down the hall one day, and an old, grizzled veteran threw his beefy arm 493 
over my shoulder and said, ‘Kid, do you want some advice?’ And I thought, ‘Oh god, sure, let’s go 494 
for it.  I could use all the advice I can get.’  And he said, ‘Quit.’  I said, ‘Joe, what are you talking 495 
about?’  He said, ‘If you think about it, it makes a lot of sense.  You’ve had the best four years and 496 
the best tour of duty that anyone has ever had in this outfit.  You’ve got medals, you’ve got 497 
promotions, you’ve got this, you’ve got that.  You’re going to spend the next 30 years looking for 498 
the same thing and you aren’t going to find it.’  And he said, ‘Besides, there are about 2,000 young 499 
FSOs out there— 500 
Field Service Officers? 501 
Foreign Service Officers—you know, whatever—‘your contemporaries [Hushed] who are just 502 
waiting to prove to you that you’re not nearly as good as you think you are.’  [Interviewer laughs]  I 503 
thought about that, and I said, ‘I’ll get out.’  And Colby, to his credit, also said to me that if you were 504 
going to stay in the government you needed a second job.  You needed to be a lawyer or an 505 
academic, or get something else rather than selling used cars.  He said what happens to old CIA 506 
officers is not very pretty, because no one wants to hire them.  What do they do?  No one—you 507 
know. So that was when I decided to go—I figured I’d done my doctoral field work on a degree, 508 
and so I went back to Princeton, did some undergraduate work, went to [the University of] Chicago 509 
where Clifford Geertz was teaching, and a lot of good people were teaching.  Good anthropology 510 
department.  So I was just about to move to Chicago when Paul Nitze tried—got me to go back, 511 
and I thought that was too good a chance to see what it was like to work at the very top. And that 512 
was very disappointing, so then I decided, ‘Well, why don’t I become an artist?’ 513 
 514 
(27:51)  Now what was your job with Paul Nitze? 515 
I was his special assistant, basically, to do what he wanted me to do—I mean, that’s when he asked 516 
me to cull his speeches for. . . [Before the recording started Mr. Lawrence said that Mr. Nitze asked 517 
him to pull together all of Nitze’s speeches on Southeast Asia and critique them.  Lawrence did so 518 
and Nitze paid the advice little mind.  Years later, says Lawrence, Nitze essentially told him, ‘You 519 
were right.’] 520 
That’s right.  You had said this before we got the recorder. So just so I remember, he was in 521 
what position at that time? 522 
He was the—he had just come on.  Clark Clifford had just been named Secretary of Defense, taking 523 
McNamara’s place.  Clifford’s job was to persuade Johnson to get out of Vietnam.  Nitze, his 524 
deputy—his job was basically to run the department.  I was not suited, really, for doing what I was 525 
doing, because I was a field person.  I didn’t know defense policy, I didn’t know the department.  526 
And Paul did it because he knew what I did in Laos and, I think, was admiring of what I had done.  527 
And he wanted to keep—Paul was always trying to collect bright young guys around him, to form 528 
something of a nucleus.  And I suspect I was part of the nucleus.  The problem was that also part of 529 
the nucleus were guys who really knew how to play the Washington game well, and I’m thinking of 530 
the fact that a guy named Dick Holbrook was a special assistant to a guy in the White House, and a 531 
guy named Tony Lake was a special assistant to a guy in the State Department, and we would have 532 
special assistant lunches, and I very quickly realized that these guys played the game a whole lot 533 
better, and liked it a whole lot better than I did.  So that’s when I decided to take a sharp left-hand 534 
turn and head for something I’d always wanted to do, which was to paint and draw.  So that’s sort of 535 
the very quick genesis of it all. 536 
 537 
(29:56)  OK.  Well, I’m going to haul us back to Laos now. 538 
Yup. 539 
If I remember you being quoted in Roger Warner’s book, you talked about Bill Lair and that  540 
he was a good mentor but he was also good at—this may not be the right word, but I’ll use 541 
it anyway—manipulating people subtly, maybe even helpfully, but that he was… 542 
Oh yeah.  Oh yes.  He had become a very—Bill had become Thai.  Bill—I mean, there was very 543 
little of the Texas A & M guy left, except when he wanted to pull it out of the back closet.  And he 544 
became very…[Pauses] to the extent that you can use that term to describe how the Thai mind or 545 
the Oriental mind works through indirection as opposed to in your face—‘this is what the fuck I 546 
want.’  He had really made that transition, and he was very adept, and very careful at keeping at least 547 
the face of the person he was going after clean—and his own—and yet getting what he needed.  So I 548 
don’t think Bill would be—I use that term almost as a term of admiration,— 549 
Exactly.  I— 550 
—not in sort of the Western term.  Because if you’re going to survive in Thailand or in any of those 551 
cultures, you do become manipulative in the sense that—you’ve got several different agendas going. 552 
 553 
(31:33)  Yeah.  [Perhaps I should have said] ‘indirectly influential.’ 554 
Indirectly influential.  You got it. 555 
Now—again, if I remember this correctly, you served something like a two-month 556 
probationary period under Pat Landry when you got started? 557 
Did I?   558 
That’s what Roger [Warner] wrote, so I’m trusting Roger—that sort of before you were— 559 
I’m sure.  I mean, he would have been a fool not to.  [Interviewer laughs]  Yeah, I don’t think it was 560 
ever stated clearly that ‘you guys’—I think I was there with three or four—and I can’t remember.  561 
There was a guy named [Pauses] Oh!  It’ll come to me tonight.  [Interviewer chuckles]  I think we 562 
went out with a guy named Terry Ward, who stayed in the Agency.  He came out with me.  Joe 563 
somebody, and then there was a red-headed guy, and it was clear that we were all sort of in the pool 564 
to begin with, right?  [Pauses]  Well, they clearly made a judgment on the red-headed guy.  He was 565 
totally incompetent to work with third country nationals.  So I remember he ended up being sent to 566 
the training base at Hua Hin, where he was in charge of manuals.  So clearly they made that 567 
[decision].  Joe went down (‘cause Joe was married and his wife worked for the Agency as a 568 
secretary)—he went down to Takhet—Takhet, I think.  And I think he did a very good job down 569 
there. But he couldn’t go in country because he had responsibilities.  And Terry…[Pauses]  Terry 570 
was more like me, but I think he went to the south, not because he was farmed—they just, they 571 
needed—I think Terry was as good as I was, if not better.  And I was—and so I’m sure there was a 572 
vetting process that went on. 573 
 574 
(33:52)  OK.  I think the one unfortunately-worded question that I asked Bill Lair when I 575 
saw him was, ‘I read through your Texas Tech oral history interview, and you mention Pat 576 
Landry, but not much, and I was just curious to know more about your working 577 
relationship.’  And I think he inferred that I was suggesting there was some kind of conflict 578 
in the relationship, and I wasn’t at all, because from what little I’ve heard, the two worked 579 
almost miraculously together.  How would you describe the two of them, and even just Pat 580 
Landry alone, about whom I know very little? 581 
They were very different.  Pat—I mean, they started out in the same place if not indeed in the same 582 
class.  But Pat was never long—Pat’s long suit was not subtle indirection.  There was much more of 583 
a Texas A&M guy in Pat at the end than there ever was in Bill.  Pat was a profane, hard-driving, 584 
hard-working, hard-drinking, really good man, who probably—and I don’t know this—probably had 585 
been given an opportunity to rise in the Agency and blew it somehow, ‘cause he had a temper, and 586 
he didn’t—he had no problem calling somebody an asshole—none.  And I think why Pat and Bill 587 
worked together so well was that Bill was far more diplomatic.  He needed somebody behind him to 588 
sometimes give him some backbone in a bad situation, and Pat was willing to do a lot of the shit 589 
work that Bill was either incompetent or just didn’t want to do—a lot of the personnel crap.  So I 590 
think they did work well together. [Pauses]  I don’t know what happened after ’66.  There was 591 
another nine years…  I think Pat gets ill, and I think he deteriorates physically.  And I think this 592 
bothered Bill a lot.  Because they used to fight—I mean, they would fight pretty well together, at 593 
least when I was there.  And I know Pat died sadly, because I think he had very bad Alzheimer’s 594 
toward the end.  [Pauses]  I’m not sure that the—as far as I knew, I think their relationship, at least 595 
in the years I was there, was a very good ‘I’ll do this, you do that’ kind of thing.  And Bill relied on 596 
Pat very, very [much], because Pat was extremely good at sorting out and cracking the whip over 597 
American—particularly the Americans.  Pat did not spend a lot of time, I think, with the Thais, and 598 
certainly never with the Hmong.  He never came up country.  That’s about…  He was a back-office 599 
guy.  He was indispensable in that role, because Bill was not about to do it, and Bill trusted Pat 600 
implicitly, and as far as I know, they never had a—Bill never had a reason not to trust [Pat].  But I 601 
don’t know what happened at the end. 602 
 603 
(37:55)  Now [as I understand it], you, in one of your early responsibilities, worked with Pat 604 
training some of the early SGU units in Hua Hin.  Is that right? 605 
Yes, actually, I did.  I was responsible for getting together, with Vang Pao’s help, the early units that 606 
were to mimic the Thai [PARU] teams.  The SGU thing, the battalions came later.  So initially what 607 
we wanted to do was to get the young leaders, the young kids who were flexible and could learn 608 
languages, and the sons of important Hmong leaders, and give them training similar to that which 609 
the PARU had gotten.  I cannot remember what they were called, but it was something like…I don’t 610 
know.  [Later he remembers they were the SOT, Special Operations Teams.]  So we were training 611 
radio operators, medics, sort of a smattering of military technology, and the PARU trained them in 612 
Hua Hin, and I went down, the only time I was ever in Hua Hin was when I brought—I either 613 
brought or came to visit the first of my class that were going through training.  Other than that, I 614 
never went back.  [Pauses]  And then subsequently Hua Hin was used for larger units, but initially it 615 
was just the small [ones].  The actual battalions we ended up—we did most of that training in Laos, 616 
in country, although some of their leaders, I suspect, went, were taken out of country, but I don’t 617 
know where.  Takhli?  I don’t know where. 618 
 619 
(40:13)  So you said radio training… 620 
Well, if you had a PARU team of four guys, one of them was your team leader.  He was collecting 621 
intelligence, he was talking with the local people.  Maybe you had two people doing that.  One was 622 
certainly a radio communications person who had to know one-time pads and all that kind of 623 
bullshit. 624 
One-time pads? 625 
One-time pads—you know, CIA jargon.  It’s the way you encode a message.  I’ve got a pad with a 626 
series of absolute random numbers, and my friend—you’ve got the other pad.  And it’s all done by 627 
computer, so the numbers—theoretically you can’t, there’s no pattern to the randomness of the 628 
numbers.  And you just start with the given letter and then you write your message and then 629 
transpose it into text that way.  That was what—and every night I would write one of my messages, 630 
and I used to drive those kids crazy, ‘cause I never knew when to shut up.  [Interviewer laughs]  But 631 
that—you have that, you clearly have that capacity, ‘cause what we were trying to—the thought was 632 
to take those teams when they came back, and send them into places, ‘cause—I think we only had 633 
about five or six PARU teams, and so it was to sort of have a junior PARU effort elsewhere in the 634 
country.  And they were good kids. 635 
 636 
(42:00)  So what was your first encounter with Vang Pao, and how did that relationship 637 
begin?  I’m sure we’ll be bringing him up repeatedly during the rest of this interview, but 638 
what about the early time… 639 
Well, he—we met in a little hut in [Pauses], which is where their headquarters were.  We got along 640 
pretty well right from the start…We got along very well, and as I said, I spoke some French, and he 641 
spoke some French, and later on we—once I learned Lao, he would speak to me in Lao, and then he 642 
would use—Lao is a very simple language, but not a very extensive vocabulary—you’d just use 643 
French for the words you didn’t know.  We got along extremely well.  I think he—I think he was 644 
impressed by my willingness to hunker down and live his life.  And I think he knew—and I’m sure 645 
Bill Lair told him that I was—for many, for a long time I think Vang Pao would have preferred to 646 
talk to Bill Lair, but Bill Lair had other things to do, so poor old Vang Pao got me.  So—but it took 647 
time, and I think over time trust was developed, and trust was—I wasn’t going to fuck him up, so 648 
we became very close. 649 
 650 
(44:08)  So you’re training troops, you’re conducting—well, I don’t know if you should call 651 
them negotiations, but certainly you’re building a relationship with Vang Pao,  652 
Yup. 653 
you’re doing all of these things at the tender age of 22. 654 
Yup. 655 
Was there at least a wee bit of insecurity about—‘Oh my goodness, what am I doing here?’ 656 
and ‘Do I have the right stuff?’ and ‘Am I making the right decisions?’ and if there ever was, 657 
were there people other than Bill Lair that maybe you could turn to, to bounce ideas off of 658 
or— 659 
No.  Bill Lair was the only person—I never went behind Bill’s back.  His relationship with the 660 
ambassadors—Charlie Whitehurst and various others—I can’t remember all of them—was always 661 
tenuous enough so that I—Bill said, ‘I don’t want them fucking around up here,’ and I said, ‘Great, 662 
‘cause I don’t want them here, either, so if I don’t get it out of you, we won’t get it.’  And I always—663 
they were always, by and large their learning curve was a whole lot steeper than mine, because they 664 
had to forget a whole bunch of shit in order to get on the curve.  So I—there was never any time 665 
that I felt at all tempted in any way, shape, or form of going behind Bill’s back, because I didn’t 666 
think—first of all, I could always talk to Bill, and we might not always agree on things, but Bill sort 667 
of respected—toward the end I think he respected my judgment pretty well, and if I felt very 668 
strongly about that we don’t do this or we don’t do that or something else, he never was dictatorial  669 
in any way, shape, or form.  I’m sorry, what was the first part of your question? 670 
 671 
(46:09)  Well, whether there were—any maybe it’s not so much about policy as getting to 672 
know the lay of the land a little better or getting to know about the Hmong people or about 673 
how things had worked prior to your arrival. 674 
Well, you see, the interesting thing was that Bill actually didn’t know the Hmong people.  I did, in 675 
that sense, and in September of ‘62, during that first six-month period when we are really under 676 
wraps, in order to not become an alcoholic like old Tony, I actually spend my time interviewing  677 
every Hmong leader I can, and I start putting clans together, I start talking to witch doctors and 678 
medicine people about what plants they use, I start talking to people about—you know, ‘How old 679 
are you when you start fucking?’ I mean, I’m a junior field anthropologist, because there’s really not 680 
much else for me to do, and I don’t do well just sitting around doing nothing.  So that part of it was, 681 
in effect, extremely valuable toward the end, because I know what the clans are, I know what the 682 
feuds are, I know who’s done what to whom 30 years ago, I know who you trust or don’t trust, and 683 
for what reason.  So it was like an incubator into the [Pauses] into the sociology and anthropology of 684 
the Hmong.  And that’s sadly, what none of my successors and those guys who had a whole bunch 685 
of Americans to pal around with at night never had. 686 
 687 
(48:31)  Can you remember, as someone who came in knowing very little about the Hmong, 688 
specific ‘aha’ moments or specific things that struck you about their clan organization or 689 
their sense of spirituality or their herbal or ritual healing practices, or really anything at all 690 
that stands out in your mind? 691 
Well, I spent a great deal of time talking to them about animism and what was—I think once I sort 692 
of got a grip on how their world is populated, in terms of the spirit world, that was something of an 693 
‘aha’ moment, because I realized that if I could get myself out of my agnostic Protestant 694 
background, structured with all the problems of how I grew up and how I ended up thinking, then it 695 
really became—you can sort—that gave me a real insight into how they thought and how they 696 
operated, because  if you see, or if you make the assumption that everything has an animus of some 697 
kind, then they, I can see where it’s not so difficult to get from there to how they would fight, 698 
because they didn’t want to kill anything, basically, and they didn’t even want to kill their enemies.  699 
You would fight to such a degree where your enemy would have to leave, but you would always 700 
leave your enemy a way out.  And once I sort of got to that, I sort of came to realize how, why Laos 701 
was the way it was, because that general perception of how you fight—and there were fascinating 702 
books on ancient Thai warfare which I found, which I did get my hands on when I would go out.  703 
And so I would try to make that transposition to the Hmong, with certain qualifications, obviously, 704 
and what that also gave me was— [Pauses] that was an ‘aha’ moment.  The second sort of ‘aha’ 705 
moment was the idea—when we started fooling—this idea of using the King as an overarching 706 
symbol, and when I discovered—again, this is not, I don’t think this is written down, but in the 707 
1880s or 1890s,  the Vietnamese invaded northern Laos, and the Hmong, who were then in the 708 
Plaines de Jarres—more or less where they were—banded together and resisted, and in effect saved 709 
the kingdom, or the King, the Luang Prabang King, and that was why—the King then gave to the 710 
Hmong of Xieng Khouang a greater degree of self-governance than they had, than any other 711 
minority group had.  And then, what struck me as interesting was when we talked about—we had 712 
these zones, you know, surrounding the Plaines de Jarres, and I realized as I was talking with some 713 
old naikong from some place, that the zones they had used almost 60 years earlier were precisely the 714 
same zones with the same families running them that were used when we were there.  So I began to 715 
get a sense of historical continuity, which in a language that is an unwritten language is sort of 716 
fascinating.  So there were a lot of those kinds of connections that I made during the six months 717 
when I was just talking to people.  718 
 719 
(53:16)  Were there, in general, responses of surprise that you were interested, or did they 720 
simply sort of take you in when you asked and tell you what you wanted to know, or… 721 
The latter. 722 
OK.   723 
The latter. 724 
Interesting. 725 
Yeah.  We got along very well.  I suppose they were surprised.  They didn’t say to me, ‘Oh, I’m 726 
surprised,’ [Interviewer chuckles] but if you asked them the right questions, they would say, ‘Oh 727 
yeah, well this is why this happened and this is why we don’t like these people and this is why’—I 728 
mean, they would rattle on—I mean, to varying degrees, not all of them. 729 
 730 
(54:06)  So did you learn the intricacies of both Green and White Hmong? 731 
Not really.  I was dealing mostly with White and some Striped.  The Green, if I’m not mistaken, was 732 
a clan more concentrated in the area of Dien Bien Phu in Northern—I don’t think I ever 733 
consciously ran across a Green Hmong that I know—and I couldn’t really tell the difference 734 
between the Striped and the White—I mean in terms of behavior.  I’m sure—there was a woman in 735 
Missoula who I knew pretty well who did her dissertation on the various intricacies of the woven 736 
patterns, and she said she could see—I have that somewhere, but I never could figure that out 737 
particularly. 738 
 739 
(55:11)  A remark that Bill Lair made to me that surprised me was that at the time [already 740 
early 1960s] he was telling people, ‘We need to do as much for the Hmong as we can before 741 
we abandon them’—that he already had a sense very early in this process that there would 742 
come a day when the United States would just pull up stakes and go.  Is that something you 743 
clearly remember? 744 
Absolutely.  And that was the reason—that was the reason why I got so unhappy when [distracted 745 
by a pesky deer fly]  No, my whole pattern—I mean, there were several things going on.  One, that 746 
was why I felt so badly for him later on, because it was counter to everything he [Lair] believed in 747 
and what I had come to believe that the only way we could possibly work our way out of this place 748 
was to keep such a low profile that you almost—unlike what we’re doing in Iraq, you almost had to 749 
rely on the local people right from the get-go.  And if you weren’t going to get something done you 750 
weren’t going to get something done, but it was them who weren’t going to get something done.  751 
Right?  So from the very, very start the whole thrust of what we tried to do was not to push them 752 
out on the limb any further than they—so that when we did leave they could get back off the limb.  753 
And of course this is what the militarization of Northern Laos prevented them from doing, because 754 
they became such a target and such a pain in the ass to the North Vietnamese that that was it.  And 755 
that was the whole purpose, or one of the purposes behind the political attachment to the King, so 756 
that we were not involved in any way, shape, or form to where their allegiances were.  It was also—757 
we were parsimonious, I would say, as far as aid was concerned, and Pop agreed with that.  I mean, 758 
he never wanted to give them so much help that they wouldn’t want to go back home.  So I think 759 
there was a general consensus among Pop Buell, Bill Lair, myself, and a guy named Doc Weldon, 760 
who was truly an amazing man. 761 
 762 
(57:59)  Charles Weldon, I think? 763 
Yes. 764 
Did you work closely with him? 765 
Yeah. 766 
Well, anyway, finish that thought [Chuckles] 767 
Yeah.  And he’s the one person I did get to see when I went back in ’99, just before he died.  And 768 
we had a wonderful talk.   769 
 770 
(58:22)  But you all agreed in terms of keeping spending low and… 771 
Yes, yes, because otherwise you would destroy something that was very important, and you would 772 
give them a false sense of—you know, Big Mother America.  And their perceptions—I remember 773 
having these long, turgid discussions about politics with Vang Pao where he would discuss the 774 
values of capitalism, and I thought, as I was listening to him go on about this, that, and the other 775 
thing, ‘You know, [Laughs] it isn’t as simple as you seem to think.’  And he had a very simplistic 776 
view of the world.  And he thought—and I kept saying, ‘VP, we’re going to leave one day.’  And he 777 
said yes, he knew that.  And he said, ‘That’s why I have the opium under my house.’  [Both laugh] 778 
Yeah, we’ll get to that, too! 779 
But in effect it made perfectly good sense!  He said, ‘You know, you are going to leave, or 780 
something is going to go wrong, and I need to be able to pay my men for a year until I can find 781 
somebody else to help me.  So that was—and I said, ‘I think that makes a lot of sense to me.  Just 782 
don’t get too much.  If you get too much you’re going to be able to—you’re going to be a target.’  783 
And he understood that—at least he said he understood that. 784 
 785 
(1:00:07)  And I imagine the CIA wasn’t really crazy about his dealings with opium of any 786 
kind, either. 787 
No.  No.  And so I used to have to—I mean, they would send me out a message every month, every 788 
couple of months and say—‘cause I admitted freely that the stuff was there.  I said, ‘There’s no 789 
sense pretending it’s not there—it is there.’  And I said, ‘But it’s there for a specific reason.  And 790 
here’s the reason.  And as long as it doesn’t become a hoard, then I don’t think you worry about 791 
this.  This is providential planning.’  And it—Vang Pao did not smoke opium.  He had to pay off his 792 
corrupt co-leaders, if you will.  I think when he—when I knew him well, I thought he was quite an 793 
extraordinary human being.  I don’t think he stayed that way, but that’s something we can talk about 794 
later. 795 
 796 
(1:01:08)  Oh, indeed.  Well since you brought up Doc Weldon, and I assume you had at 797 
least some dealing with Pat McCreedy as well— 798 
Not really.  Pat was very prickly, and I really liked Jiggs a great deal. He was in the same boat, as far 799 
as I was concerned, as Pop and Bill.  And I used Jiggs as my eyes and ears wherever he went and I 800 
didn’t go.  He would often stop by and say, ‘You know, you’d better go look at Tal Anoi ‘cause 801 
there’s some real trouble going on there,’ or whatever.  So I had less to do with him in the sense that 802 
he had organized his own supplies and his own operation far more effectively than Pop had his, so 803 
Jiggs didn’t need me like Pop needed me.  And Pat I knew, but she, I think, spent more of her time 804 
in the south than in the north. 805 
 806 
(1:02:18)  OK.  I need to double back for just a moment.  We were talking about Hmong 807 
culture and such.  Did you ever attend a Hmong New Year or a Hmong wedding or a 808 
Hmong funeral or— 809 
All the time. 810 
All the time? 811 
Well sure. 812 
What do you remember about—I don’t know, maybe we shouldn’t focus on all three—let’s 813 
start with the Hmong funeral.  What do you remember about that particular ritual and how 814 
it was practiced in the villages in Laos? 815 
Well they—you know, it’s in the film, actually. 816 
Yeah. 817 
They dress the body, and they would then use the paper—Chinese paper money, and the idea was 818 
that there was a group of keeners, who were hysterical to watch doing it, and curiously enough, I 819 
thought of them when I was standing on a platform of East Glacier, Montana waiting for my 820 
brother to come in with his kids on a train, and there were some Blackfoot Indian ladies waiting for 821 
a body to be returned to them from wherever—some place back east.  And the body came off the 822 
train, and these women started keening and wailing in a pattern, in a manner that was so spookily 823 
similar to what I had witnessed 20 years earlier in Laos that it was one of those sort of ‘Oh, shit!’ 824 
moments!  [Interviewer laughs]  But there was that whole process.  And then the women would 825 
leave the hut and go out and smoke a cigarette.  I mean, they didn’t smoke, but they would start 826 
laughing and talk about something else.  And then they would go back in and immediately start—827 
No, I watched, I went to a number of funerals.  The funerals themselves were really sort of—were 828 
day-long if not week-long events where it was a personal, a personal goodbye said by all the relatives.  829 
I mean that was why the body was left on the table, was that everyone who was related to that 830 
person had to basically come and touch the body one more time.  And one of the issues that 831 
bothered the Hmong greatly was that the body theoretically in the spirit world goes back to the place 832 
that it was born, where it started out.  And the problem was that it had a lot of rivers to cross, and 833 
spirits don’t swim. So there was a lot of concern over whether—how they were going to get home.  834 
So [Chuckles] that I recall being an issue.  And I’m not sure how it was ever resolved, frankly.  I 835 
mean, I— 836 
 837 
[Anne Garrels comes home, recorder turned off.  New track begins.  In the interim the two have 838 
taken the couple’s three Labradors for a walk.] 839 
 840 
(0:00)  Well, when we left off I think we were finishing off talking about funeral rituals, and 841 
while we were walking you mentioned that you observed a woman engaging in embroidery 842 
in a way that you found quite amazing. 843 
Yeah, and it was one of those things when you realize that the people you’re with have a different 844 
matrix of intelligence. 845 
Could you describe what you described earlier? 846 
Well, they would—we’re looking at a panel, and I watched—this is a panel of embroidering that is 847 
perfectly, perfectly geometric.  And it looks absolutely symmetrical.  And I watched a woman 848 
embroidering one of these enormous Hmong skirts that are heavily pleated so that they are just 849 
enormous in their—you put them on the ground and they just flatten out to a donut-type of thing.  850 
And they would start literally in one corner and they would start to embroider and embroider and 851 
the patterns would get more and more elaborate, and then they would get all the way around the 852 
circle and come back to the original point in about a year’s time, and it would end up perfectly 853 
symmetrical.  And how they did that without patterns, without any kind of, as far as I could see, no 854 
aforethought whatsoever, I found absolutely remarkable.  And I gather that’s what they—and each 855 
family has its own pattern which they repeat over and over and over again. 856 
 857 
(1:54)  Now I would imagine you used some of your art training to—I think you said you 858 
sketched some of the leaves or some of the plants that they used for herbal medicine? 859 
I tried to.  I tried to.  I found, actually, when I went back—first of all, I never had any art training— 860 
Oh!  Silly me. 861 
[Chuckles]   862 
You studied art but didn’t practice it. 863 
I studied art history.  That was my degree.  But [Pauses] when I went back and looked at those later 864 
on I was chagrined to find that they really weren’t going to tell me a lot.  So I’m afraid I’m a bust as 865 
a medical anthropologist. [Interviewer chuckles]  I just—and my description of the plants were 866 
not—I wasn’t sufficiently trained in what I should be looking for and how to describe the leaf 867 
structure.  So I just—it wasn’t, I don’t think, very helpful. 868 
 869 
(3:01)  And you were also saying that the reason, when I ask Hmong about what a wedding 870 
ceremony is like that I don’t get any answers is that there isn’t much of a ceremony to speak 871 
of. 872 
Not that I observed.  It’s more like just a reception.  I suspect that the actual work goes on behind 873 
closed doors in whatever kind of dowry and financial arrangements are to be made.  And there’s—874 
but the wooing ritual is elaborate, with the ball tossing and that sort of business. 875 
 876 
(3:38)  Oh yes, New Year!  We haven’t talked about New Year.  877 
Well, that is nothing more—that is sort of a gang wooing ritual.  [Interviewer laughs]  (I didn’t want 878 
to go for it.)  Yeah, they toss the ball back and forth, and then I—there’s a lot of banter, a lot of 879 
sexual banter that goes on with the— 880 
Oh really? 881 
Oh, yes!  Oh, no, the—I didn’t really—I didn’t understand enough Hmong to really [understand it 882 
all], but I was told by people who were there.  I mean, I spoke enough Lao to understand it, but they 883 
were going back and forth in Hmong, and basically it’s one sexual joke after another with the young 884 
girl.  So it’s—there’s a lot of stuff that goes on. 885 
 886 
(4:28)  OK.  And did you observe any shamans performing healing rituals, sort of looking 887 
into the spirit world? 888 
Yes, I did.  I watched him ride off in a—on his bench, and I watched him try to find the missing 889 
spirit that had—which was causing the person to be ill, and—yeah, I did see that on a number of 890 
occasions. 891 
 892 
(4:59)  Well let’s talk about your work to create the—I hope I have the name right here—the 893 
Union of Lao Races Radio.  Does that sound about right? 894 
That sounds about right. 895 
How did that idea come to you, or was it given to you?  And how did you go about 896 
organizing it?  Who did you recruit and what were its aims, the programming… 897 
Well, I would hate to take credit for it.  I’m not sure.  I believe I was part of it, but I think one thing 898 
one has to be careful of as you get older is you think you are both indispensable and sort of the 899 
founder of all modern knowledge.  Right?  I don’t know where the idea comes from, so let’s be clear 900 
about that.  I’m enthusiastic about the idea, because it is clear to me with an illiterate—with a group 901 
of people who are fundamentally illiterate, and who all have access to little Japanese radios.  When I 902 
—an interesting sidebar to give you an idea about this.  When, on November whatever-it-was, the 903 
day Kennedy was shot, I was in a tiny village, right—I was as close to being in North Vietnam as I 904 
ever really wanted to be, and I was with a group of young men who I was sending out into North 905 
Vietnam to monitor the roads as they come into Laos and let us know—so like a road watch intel 906 
team.  And we’d trained these guys.  They had flash cards of different kinds of trucks and military 907 
vehicles.  And I was in a little hut and all the Hmong were sleeping around me, and at about nine 908 
o’clock three of them came racing up, all with their radios, saying, ‘Your president has been killed.’  909 
So here you are.  I was about as far from civilization as you’re going to get out there, and they all 910 
were in radio contact of some station, some—maybe it was a North Vietnamese station. That would 911 
have been closer, actually, than Laos, Vientiane.  So the idea of connecting these people via radio 912 
made sense, both given the language problem—they all understood Lao.  Whether or not they 913 
could—for the most part they could understand the language, whether they could read or write it, 914 
but certainly they could—and there was a war, of course, which I guess you know, between Father 915 
Bouchard and the Baptists about— 916 
 917 
[A friend stops by to say hello.  Recorder turned off, new track begins.] 918 
 919 
(0:00)  So a war between Father Bouchard and the Baptists.  Like I said, I spoke to him, but 920 
he’s a very plain-spoken person, very modest, doesn’t really like to self-promote— 921 
No, and it really wasn’t Father Bouchard.  Father Bouchard was extremely—exactly as you 922 
described.  He had the best interests of the people at heart, and he was a very decent man. And he 923 
actually saved me from my reincarnation of my tapeworm, which we don’t have to go into. 924 
 925 
(0:32)  [Chuckles]  Just by giving you the right supplies, or… 926 
Yeah, he went down and—what he got were little bits and pieces of strychnine, from the south, 927 
where the strychnine tree grows.  You’ve got to be awfully careful how much strychnine you take; 928 
obviously if you take the whole nut, you’re done.  But if it was taken in slivers, it was very—it’s 929 
extremely good for intestinal parasites, and of course, a tapeworm is—that’s what a tapeworm is. 930 
 931 
(1:01)  That had to be one of the creepiest experiences of your life, I would think. 932 
You’re… [Pauses, interviewer laughs]  Yes.  Anyway, I like Father Bouchard a lot. He was a very, 933 
very good man.  The Baptist missionary was a little bit more Messianic and a little bit more driven to 934 
account for souls saved than Bouchard. And he—they had competing alphabets they were trying to 935 
teach the Hmong. 936 
Right. 937 
So we had—they came to me, and I had to render a judgment of Solomon— 938 
Now was this Father Bouchard or—I thought Father Bertrais was the one who came up 939 
with the other writing system. 940 
The Catholics and the Baptists, at least in my—in this instance.  I can’t speak for anyplace else.  But 941 
they had competing alphabets, and they came to me for a judgment of Solomon, and I had to draw a 942 
line on the map and say, ‘South of this line shall be Baptist territory; north of this line shall be 943 
Catholic. 944 
 945 
(2:22)  Oh my goodness.  Where roughly was that line? 946 
I have no idea.   947 
[Laughs]  OK! 948 
I have no idea. 949 
Fair enough! [Laughs] 950 
We were getting on to something else, I’m sorry. 951 
 952 
[The two try to remember what they had been discussing previously] 953 
 954 
(2:49)  Oh!  The radio station! 955 
Right. So the radio station made sense.  It was a good idea both to give the people in the north a 956 
sense that they belonged to a larger entity, [Lawrence pauses to move one of his Labradors out from 957 
under the table] and it also made it possible for Vang Pao to make it clear he wasn’t just doing stuff 958 
[only] for the Hmong.  In other words, there were programs in Lao Theung, there were programs in 959 
Lao, and there were a couple of Thais.  One worked for USAID and Pop Buell, and another one, I 960 
think, was a PARU, who were awfully good at this.  And it was one of those things that—it was up 961 
on top of a hill overlooking Long Cheng, and once it got established, I really had so much on my 962 
plate I just didn’t worry about it.  But I think it did a good job.  There was also an American—the 963 
Agency sent out an American to oversee it, who I had known in training, and he was an utter 964 
disaster as a human being, and sub—you know, he really—it was not a good job.  So I guess that 965 
was another reason I didn’t want to spend a whole lot of time with the radio station, because I didn’t 966 
like Colin very much.  But I think it did a fairly good job.  I don’t know. 967 
 968 
(4:55)  So this was, as I understand it, more to do with uniting the different ethnic groups in 969 
Laos rather than dealing, for example, with clan divisions within the Hmong culture or… 970 
Absolutely. Much more the former than the latter. 971 
 972 
[Interviewer scans his notes] 973 
 974 
(5:24)  What do recall about the movement from—Pha Dong was the first main base, as I 975 
understand it, and it was kind of foggy and unreliable.  And Pha Khao was near there, 976 
wasn’t it? 977 
Yeah, Pha Dong—Pha Dong was a rather small place, a rather—not very [substantial], but it was the 978 
place where the Hmong resistance began.  And I don’t think it was particularly defensible.  I never 979 
actually went to Pha Dong, as far as—I may be mistaken, but I can’t remember.  Pha Khao, which 980 
sat behind it, and was sort of the—was an extraordinary place.  It was like the interior of an old 981 
volcano, and the landing strip in the village sat up at about eight or nine thousand feet—no, 7,000—982 
in the middle of this sort of lost, this lost volcano—I mean, if you want a romantic spot—and then 983 
with great big karst ridges going up on either side, and you’re on the shoulder of Phou Bia, which 984 
was the tallest mountain in Laos, and that was just under 10,000 feet.  So you’re up pretty high, and 985 
because of the geological formation, it was susceptible to having—I mean, clouds would just come 986 
in and sit on top of it.  So its weather was pretty iffy.  So when we decided that when we needed to 987 
move, it was done largely because it would be more meteorologically reliable. 988 
 989 
(7:11)  And so who was in the heli—I assume it was a helicopter, not a plane, that went 990 
searching for this site that became Long Cheng? 991 
[Pauses]  That’s a good question.  I think I was in one of them, but I don’t if I—I think there’s—a 992 
lot of people claim to be the person who found Long Cheng, and I really don’t know who can 993 
actually claim that, whether it’s worthy of claim, anyway.  I mean, it seems to me that everybody—994 
the valleys were pretty well known by the people, and from Long Cheng you could see Pha Khao, so 995 
you weren’t—you know, you were maybe five miles away.  So I’m not sure it was much of a genius 996 
to decide that Long Cheng was a better place.  It was lower; you were 3,000 feet, I think, and it was 997 
much more open in its configuration.  So I’m not sure, but I’m sure somebody was in a plane at 998 
some point.  And it may well have been Vang Pao and Bill Lair, for all I know.  I just don’t know 999 
that. 1000 
 1001 
(8:29)  OK.  Now there’s one date I should have been a little more careful to look for.  When 1002 
was—when did Pha Dong finally fall?  When was it abandoned? 1003 
I have absolutely no idea. 1004 
OK.  For some reason that was one date that I just didn’t nail down. 1005 
My guess is it falls some time in 1961.  When?  I don’t know. 1006 
Maybe it’s just me looking back years later, but Vang Pao was, it seems, very upset at losing 1007 
it, and yet everyone seemed to say, ‘This is’—in the long run anyway, ‘an impractical site— 1008 
Yup. 1009 
—and we need to move.’ 1010 
All of the above. 1011 
So I suppose it was more the emotional or the dishonorable aspect of having to abandon a 1012 
site to the enemy? 1013 
That’s right.  I would think that was probably 90% of it. 1014 
 1015 
(9:17)  Two things:  one referred to by Roger and another by—is it Zalin Grant? 1016 
Zalin Grant. 1017 
Roger refers to a party that you attended at Pha Khao as an envoy of Pat Landry.  You were 1018 
bidding farewell to some Special Forces people.  They had replaced another group…that 1019 
had defended Pha Dong.  They were leaving, to be replaced by others, and you saw it as a 1020 
moment when you were there, speaking with Vang Pao in French, and they saw you as this 1021 
sort of ‘other guy’ who obviously— 1022 
 1023 
[Interviewer and Lawrence work to clarify the event that Hillmer is describing to him, which comes 1024 
from Roger Warner’s use of items Lawrence wrote more than 30 years prior.] 1025 
 1026 
(10:18)  There was a time, there was an evening, yes, I certainly do remember that, it was—and they 1027 
were called White Star at the time. 1028 
And maybe that’s where I confused you; I said Special Forces. 1029 
Well, they were all the same difference.  [Interviewer chuckles]  And there was a White Star team 1030 
that did leave, and there was another White Star team that came in.  In fact, when I go to Long 1031 
Cheng, I am with a White Star team who are very good.  [Pauses]  I’m a little worried now…I don’t 1032 
know what—it’s one of those guesswork things.  I am sure that—the White Star guys were pissed 1033 
off at having to leave the country.  They were pissed off.  They did not like the idea that the Agency 1034 
would come in with a sort of Ivy League 22-year-old asshole. [Interviewer chuckles]  I think there 1035 
was a lot of that.  What do these guys think they’re doing? 1036 
 1037 
(11:32)  You hadn’t paid your dues, so to speak. 1038 
Yeah.  And I wasn’t career military, and all that kind of business.  So there was certainly that aspect 1039 
to it.  Did I seize upon the hiatus between one team and another?  I’m sure I did!  It sounds like I 1040 
was pretty clever.  [Interviewer chuckles]  But I don’t— 1041 
 1042 
(11:52)  Well, I don’t think he [Warner] was implying that you did that. 1043 
What? 1044 
I don’t think he was implying that you did that. 1045 
Oh, he didn’t?   1046 
He was simply saying that you were there as Pat Landry’s representative.  You were 1047 
speaking to Vang Pao, you were both speaking in French, and these guys sort of 1048 
understand, ‘OK, this guy must be CIA, he must be somebody a cut above,’ and they 1049 
seemed rather impressed by you.  So who knows, maybe this is a story someone else told 1050 
about you.  But the way Roger wrote about it I got the impression— 1051 
I don’t think I could—I don’t think I would have said that to Roger.  The trouble is, I don’t know 1052 
who else he would have gotten it from. 1053 
Well, I think he also remarked that you felt that respect was undeserved. 1054 
Yes, absolutely! [Interviewer chuckles]  I think—well, let’s set the record straight.  Four years later I 1055 
would have said the respect was deserved.  But certainly—when I first go up there as Pat’s—I fly up, 1056 
I remember going up into Pha Khao, and I remember—I think I saw some photographs of some 1057 
White Star guys.  And I certainly would—I deserved no respect at that point whatsoever.  Later on, I 1058 
think I did. 1059 
Fair enough. 1060 
Yeah. 1061 
 1062 
(13:07)  Well, the Zalin Grant reference I wanted to ask you about—he mentions a fellow 1063 
who’s not in any of the other books that I’ve seen, and that’s Stuart Methven. 1064 
Stu Methven. 1065 
And so if you could just help me understand his role in all of this, I’d be most grateful. 1066 
I’ll try.  Stu Methven is a paramilitary officer who is in Laos, I would guess, from 1960 through the 1067 
end of ’61.  I meet Stu later on in life, and I would hazard a guess that Stu Methven knew Vang Pao, 1068 
and in effect made—I think he was, you might call a catalyst for the whole thing.  I think he’s one of 1069 
the—and I suspect he never got much credit for it.  ‘Cause I remember him coming here and—he 1070 
visited me here one summer, and he was very embittered.  And I suspect he had a reason to be.  I 1071 
think he [Coughs]—Stu Methven and a guy named Tom Fosmire… 1072 
Hmm…I’ve heard the name. 1073 
…were early paramilitary types working in Laos and/or Thailand, looking for assets, looking for—I 1074 
guess the word had gotten out, probably, that there was interest in the government—the US 1075 
government—about doing something in Laos.  Was there anything worth working with?  And I 1076 
think Methven and/or Fosmire, or both, sent the word to Lair, ‘cause Lair was, at that point, really 1077 
not involved, and sent the word to Lair, ‘You’d better meet this guy [Vang Pao], ‘cause he’s 1078 
impressive.  He’s got his people together, he’s trying to form a resistance group and they’re using old 1079 
flintlock rifles’ and whatever.  So I would think that that—I think the first meeting between Vang 1080 
Pao and Lair is probably set up by Methven, although that is not—I have no real knowledge of that. 1081 
 1082 
(15:44)  Grant seems to suggest that in the way he writes about it. 1083 
Yeah. 1084 
And it’s interesting, too—I had a student who spoke with Vang Pao.  And the way he 1085 
described his initial meeting with ‘the United States,’ as he put it, was the same kind of 1086 
language that Grant used to talk about Methven [contacting Vang Pao]:  ‘Oh, what do you 1087 
need?  What can we drop off for you?’—just little things that sort of help forge that 1088 
relationship. 1089 
I think that’s probably right, because I—this is all long before Pha Dong (or is it just about the same 1090 
time as…?) but this is before I certainly get involved. And there’s very little history that I read or can 1091 
read about it before I get there. 1092 
 1093 
(16:34)  One of the understandings, whether implied or imagined or real, is that the United 1094 
States did or did not make promises to Vang Pao about what would happen if the whole 1095 
operation went south.  And Bill Lair, who ought to know, of course, says, ‘No, no promises 1096 
were made’— 1097 
I would agree.   I don’t—you know, we certainly talked a lot about it, but it was usually in the terms 1098 
of how that kind of perception would guide you towards a particular present policy.  In other words, 1099 
the idea that this thing might go south, the idea that the Americans might not be here in six months, 1100 
informed and made a difference as to what kinds of programs, what kinds of projects you were 1101 
going to get involved in now, right? 1102 
Sure. 1103 
So I don’t think—and Vang Pao himself was of such a kind of leadership where he wasn’t going to 1104 
entertain that as something that he ought to spend a lot of time worrying about.  I don’t—but there 1105 
was not, if I understand—I don’t think there—there certainly wasn’t [that kind of understanding] 1106 
when I was there. 1107 
 1108 
(18:05)  If you wouldn’t mind going to post-Geneva Accords 1962, 1109 
[Yes] 1110 
The agreement’s made and—I’ve read this, I don’t know if you were aware if this or not, 1111 
that Averill Harriman was literally negotiating with the Soviets, and [the Soviets] said, ‘OK, 1112 
you can leave two CIA people behind’ in one way or another.  Anyway, the call is made, two 1113 
are left, and you’re one of those two. 1114 
[Yes] 1115 
Do you remember that conversation with Bill Lair, or at least anything about that phase in 1116 
which you were suddenly told, ‘You’re one of two people who are staying,’ and you were told 1117 
you were going to be Tony Poe’s—I don’t know if ‘boss’ is the right word, but it sounds like 1118 
in a way, at least— 1119 
No, I wasn’t his boss. 1120 
OK. 1121 
No, no, it was quite the opposite. 1122 
OK, well see, Bill Lair said the opposite.  He said you were.  [Laughs] 1123 
No, in effect that’s how it happened, but when we start, Tony’s 20 years my senior.  Tony is—and at 1124 
least four or five grades ahead of me.  The conversation—this all just didn’t happen overnight.  1125 
From almost the first—well, I’d say from the spring of ’62 ‘til it actually—the signing occurred in 1126 
the fall, we were—this was a topic of discussion.  What was the Agency going to do, what were the 1127 
ground rules?  And I think by the time it’s actually signed, we’ve already figured out what the impact 1128 
is going to be, and who the people are who are going to implement it.  Bill was—I mean, I think 1129 
whether that was—whether they got it 100% right, I don’t know, but I think they must have gotten 1130 
it pretty close, because I certainly go into Long Cheng three or four months before the signing of 1131 
the agreement, and my role, my job is to find a suitable open space to building a landing field, and a  1132 
place where it is easy to get aircraft in and out, and where we can do some camouflaging of what 1133 
we—of any building that goes on there, because we expect the International [Pauses] whatever 1134 
commission, it’s called—the white helicopters— 1135 
 1136 
(20:42)  Oh, the ICC. 1137 
ICC—International Control Commission, something like that—is going to—they’d have a little 1138 
trouble finding us.  So this is not something that’s just dropped like a bomb.  And when we go—and 1139 
I—see, I think I’m ready for it, ‘cause I think Bill has already told me or briefed me about it long 1140 
before it happens.  And he puts Tony in there because of Tony’s experience, more than anything 1141 
else.  And I think he [Coughs] was perfectly prepared to have Tony run the thing, except Tony had a 1142 
real alcohol problem.  And Tony didn’t want to write [Interviewer laughs]—Tony didn’t really want 1143 
to do anything except go out and shoot people.  And [Pauses] Bill and Pat were no fools, and I think 1144 
they knew pretty much whatever it said on paper, what was going to happen.  And so we sort of 1145 
survived together, Tony and I, and we [Pauses]—it wasn’t—you know, Tony and I got along 1146 
perfectly well, except he—because he didn’t get in my way and I didn’t get in his.  And the only time 1147 
he got in my way was when I had to—I rigged up this oil can as a stove, ‘cause in the middle of the 1148 
dry season it gets well below freezing up there.  It’s cold!  And his bunk was on the other side of the 1149 
stove, and we’d get that stove running so that it was pretty red hot.  And my job, on many a night, 1150 
was to take Tony in a fireman’s carry—which is not easy, ‘cause Tony was very strong and very 1151 
big—and get him over the red hot stove and into his bunk, in sort of generally the right direction.  1152 
But it really was a fact—all I had to really do was get him up and over the stove and just hope for 1153 
the best, and then he—and let him take care of himself.  He… [Pauses] because I didn’t mind 1154 
writing, and because I didn’t mind kind of doing what I was doing, I think the whole thing slightly 1155 
changed fairly rapidly over time, and then Tony, I think, got really—I think Tony’s nose got out of 1156 
joint, so that later on, when the fighting started again, and by that time, people had gotten into the 1157 
practice of coming to see me and not him, and I’m sure that’s what made him—made his life 1158 
unhappy. 1159 
 1160 
(24:14)  And the fact that you could speak French,  1161 
Yes. 1162 
and therefore were close to Vang Pao, 1163 
Yes. 1164 
And the two of them seemed to have a rather stormy relationship. 1165 
Yeah, I think that’s right.  I think that’s safe to say. [Interviewer chuckles]  I mean, I think he 1166 
respected Tony.  But Vang Pao was very shrewd, and he couldn’t use Tony very well, and he could 1167 
use me.  He knew he could get to Bill Lair through me, and I could get—you know, we both used 1168 
each other, and I don’t think there was anything wrong in that. 1169 
 1170 
(24:52)  So this is a friendly relationship, [Interviewer is describing VP but is unclear, and 1171 
Lawrence thinks he’s describing Poe] but one in which both of you choose, essentially, not 1172 
to fire your guns at each other.  He’s not doing anything too radical; he’s passing things by 1173 
you, and you control the purse strings in a way, and— 1174 
Sort of. 1175 
At least you can contact Bill and say, ‘Here’s what’s going on,’ and if it’s not good… 1176 
Yeah, Bill would ask me, and I would be—because I liked Tony.  I respected him for what he had 1177 
done.  He was tough to handle.  He was not a team player.  He was a loner, he was a recon, he 1178 
was—you know, he was one of these guys you want to send out in the jungle with nothing, 1179 
[Interviewer chuckles] and he’ll live off the land, and he’ll get you 500 ears from the enemy.  I mean, 1180 
he did a lot of that sort of stuff.  So there was a lot of bravado associated with him.  And the pilots 1181 
loved him because he—god, could he talk. [Interviewer chuckles]   But the point was that 90%, 1182 
most of what he said was actually true!  I mean, he actually—if you wanted a story of an 1183 
extraordinarily…[Pauses]  There’s a figure in [Pauses to think]  I think his name is Moon.  [Pauses]  1184 
Peter?  I’ll think of it.  He’s a novelist.  [Pauses]  Matheson, Peter Matheson.  And he wrote a book 1185 
about an insurgency in South America, and there’s a character named Moon in that, and I’ve got to 1186 
go find that and re-read it.   But it struck me—I remember reading it out there, and it struck me as a 1187 
beautiful parallel description of Tony Poe.  Tony was an interesting guy.  I’m glad—I think Bill did a 1188 
very good job in getting him out of there, because I think we probably—we would not have—we 1189 
left on very amicable terms as far as I recall. 1190 
 1191 
(27:14)  Well he had—I suppose you could say it was out of necessity, but he had, at least on 1192 
one occasion, literally gotten into the middle of a gunfight, hadn’t he?...I thought there was 1193 
a case in which he was wounded because he was— 1194 
Yes, I think that came later.  I think that comes later when the attack on Sam Neua occurs.  I think it 1195 
was at Sam Neua province.  And he did, he did get wounded, but I—and I’m not quite sure what—1196 
but I think he is brought back.. He has been up in the north in the Yao people, and then when this 1197 
big offensive starts in Sam Neua, I think he comes back to help out. 1198 
 1199 
(28:16)  OK.  [Pauses]  Actually, the comment I made about you not firing your guns at each 1200 
other, I actually meant with Vang Pao—that in a way he was, he was the leader of the 1201 
Hmong who maybe could have, on his own, run off and initiated some offensive, but he was 1202 
running it by you and making sure that it was going to be given some kind of approval by 1203 
his friends.  And your control over him, whether it was— 1204 
Oh, I see what you mean. 1205 
Whether it was his opium trade or whatever, was that you were Bill Lair’s emissary and you 1206 
had some control over what he was going to be given. 1207 
Yes.  Yes, yes, all of the above.  But the question is to what extent did he conceive of these as—the 1208 
situation as limitations and to what extent did he—that was just what he thought should be done at 1209 
that particular time?  I think later on—I think his sense of grandiosity got the better of him, and 1210 
unfortunately I wasn’t around at that point to say, ‘We can’t do it.’ 1211 
 1212 
(29:33)  Well, this is another question I asked Bill Lair.  I said, ‘When Vint Lawrence left, it 1213 
seems to me that while you had other people who came in, that there was really no one like 1214 
Vint who had that kind of relationship, and who could sort of dissuade him or bring him 1215 
back down to earth in the same way.  I’m not sure he agreed with me, but it seemed that 1216 
way from the reading I’ve done.  It seems like you at least in part concur with that. 1217 
[Pauses]  I would say—I would think that yes, that was true to a considerable extent.  However, 1218 
Vang Pao was smart enough—I had a guy who took over for me, a guy named Jonathan Randall.  1219 
And Jon didn’t have the language skills or he didn’t have other skills.  And my sense is that Vang 1220 
Pao, when he needed to, would just go over—would say, ‘I want to see Bill.’  And Randall was not 1221 
about to say, ‘Well, you can’t see Bill, you have to see me.’  Or if he did, maybe that happened once.  1222 
And then when Vang Pao and Bill did get together, Vang Pao made it clear—so I [Pauses] again, I’m 1223 
unclear in my own mind the extent of what my power actually was.  I think I wielded it wisely, I 1224 
think it was there.  I don’t—I would be uneasy sort of standing up and saying, ‘I could tell Vang Pao 1225 
to do this, this, and this, and he’d do it.’  I don’t think that was our relationship at all.  I think it was 1226 
much more subtle than that.  He would propose.  We would discuss.  I would check with Bill or Pat.  1227 
I would come back with suggestions.  We would discuss again, and he would propose—you know, I 1228 
mean, I would leave the final—the final implementation of how he wanted to do a particular thing 1229 
up to him.  But we did talk a lot.  In those discussions was I able to shape what his plan was?  I 1230 
suspect I might have, on the margins.  But I would be loath to say that I was the brains behind this 1231 
stuff. 1232 
 1233 
(32:17)  Fair enough.  [Pauses]  So did Lair sneak into Laos often, or was your 1234 
communication almost entirely by radio and through impersonal channels? 1235 
He would come maybe once a month or something like that—or when things started to kind of 1236 
loosen up a little bit, I often would go down to Udorn for the night, and Bill and Pat and I would go 1237 
out for dinner, and we’d just go through a raft of problems and things that I needed—that they 1238 
needed to know.  And he would come up—I mean, it wasn’t that he didn’t but I think that I 1239 
probably went down to Udorn more frequently, because, you see, at that point, Bill was running 1240 
stuff in the northwest with the Yao, and the Hmong, he was also—he and Pat were also responsible 1241 
for trying to get road watch teams from central Laos and southern Laos into the Ho Chi Minh Trail.  1242 
He had a pretty full plate.  So my sense is that he figured between Vang Pao and myself, we had it 1243 
sort of under control, and he didn’t need to watch this.  I know he was very worried about how 1244 
Americans and Lao—in the south the teams were American and Lao, albeit a better, by and large a 1245 
better class of Lao soldier than you found generally in the north.  But it was still…[Pauses]  It was 1246 
awfully hard for them to get those programs up and running in an effective way.  And I suspect that 1247 
that absorbed a great deal of their time.  So as long as we were seen to be puttering along fairly well, 1248 
and he could—and I think Bill relied on me never to lie to him, and never—and to let him know 1249 
everything that was going on, and I think I did.  I mean, I probably…[Laughs] Many years later there 1250 
was a CIA reunion on the Flathead Lake in Montana.  And I said to Annie, ‘We’ll go to one of these 1251 
things.’  They happen every year.  It’s a tedious and sad event, because it’s these old, by and large, air 1252 
operations guys, none of whom I really knew.  But the air operations teams were substantial.  There 1253 
was a lot more people in—doing these air operations than there ever was of those of us on the 1254 
ground.  I mean, there were, what, maybe four or five people on the ground.  And it was a big 1255 
party—it was about 400 people.  I knew five.  I knew Bill Lair, one of my classmates who is in the 1256 
South, a couple of other people.  I just didn’t know very many people. I mean, everybody knew who 1257 
I was, but I didn’t know them.  And this young woman came up—or not so young—this woman 1258 
came up to me and she said, ‘I just want to look you in the eye.’  I said, ‘OK.  Why do you need to 1259 
do that?’  She said, ‘You wrote the longest, most’— she said, ‘My vocabulary today consists of the 1260 
language that you kept using in your messages.’  [Interviewer chuckles]  She said, ‘It was in English, 1261 
but I had to use a dictionary… [Both laugh]  Ask Annie—I mean, she was there!  Annie came to this 1262 
thing, [Laughing] and she remembers this look of absolute astonishment in this woman’s face as she 1263 
said, [With anguish:] ‘I had to type out every single message you wrote!  And Jesus, you never 1264 
stopped!’  [Laughs] 1265 
 1266 
(36:29)  Now this is something I’m—I really don’t—were the reports that you sent— 1267 
There were two kinds.  Initially, when we were in there black in the first six months to a year, it’s all 1268 
by radio transmission, because there’s very little air traffic landing at Long Cheng and then taking off 1269 
and going to Udorn. 1270 
And this is largely intelligence that you’ve received from PARU teams in the— 1271 
No, I—well I had two sources.  I had [Pauses]  oh, I  remember!  Those people we trained at Hua 1272 
Hin were called SOT teams—Special Operation Teams.  So they were modeled on PARU.  And we 1273 
had those radios spread out all over the north.  We had about 35 of them or something like that.  1274 
The number—don’t hold me to the number, but there were a lot.  There were maybe six PARU 1275 
teams that were not (***)—maybe even fewer than that.  But every night every one of these Special 1276 
Operation Teams would send in their message of what the activity during the day was.  It would be 1277 
decoded, then it would be given—it would be in Lao.  It would be given to a translator, who would 1278 
translate it into English.  I would take all those messages and do a wrap-up summary of the day’s 1279 
activities and send it to Lair, where—by encryption, every night.  So I kept the operating team up 1280 
half the night encoding my messages.  Later on, we would have pouches, and that was better for me, 1281 
because I found—I kept getting gigged for writing messages that were too long and I was keeping 1282 
people up too late at night.  [Interviewer chuckles]  So in the end, I would write these long memos, 1283 
which were then typed up and sent on in a pouch to Washington, in which I tried to give a fairly 1284 
accurate read on the politics, on what was happening, not necessarily in terms of which enemy 1285 
battalion was facing us here, but in the momentum of what I thought—the critical momentum of 1286 
where the project was going politically within the Lao system, where there’s a coup—I mean, there 1287 
were coup rumors all the time—opium, allegiance to the King, philosophy of how you go into a 1288 
village and how you connect it to the larger entity.  And I wrote a lot!  And this poor lady was 1289 
responsible for typing up all of these and sending them on.  [Interviewer chuckles]  And she was—1290 
she said she learned a great deal of… [Pauses]  She said it was quite an education. 1291 
 1292 
(40:01) She improved her grammar tremendously. 1293 
Not her grammar, no. 1294 
Her vocabulary, pardon me.  [Laughs] 1295 
No, no, vocabulary.  I’m a terrible grammarian.  No, I don’t do that.  I don’t spell well and I don’t 1296 
punctuate well.  [Interviewer chuckles]  But I can spin out the words. 1297 
 1298 
(40:21)  So until the time that you had the pouch, these messages were going straight to 1299 
Lair. 1300 
No, they all went straight to Lair, even at the end.  They always went to Lair.  Lair read them in 1301 
whatever way he wanted to.  He could either read them in a typed-up manuscript, pouch, or he 1302 
probably read them in my longhand.  But I would write them in longhand and send them on down, 1303 
and they were then typed and cleaned up, and I suppose vetted for—you know, everyone had a code 1304 
name, and Lawrence was Mark—my name was a wonderful name.  It was ‘another dispatch from—1305 
unforgettable dispatch from Mark W. Cechotd.  [Interviewer tries to repeat the last name] C-E-C-H-1306 
O-T-D was my name.  [Interviewer chuckles]  And [Laughing]—and then they were read with great 1307 
anticipation at the Friday briefings or something like that. 1308 
 1309 
(41:23)  So…from beginning to end these things were also read by Colby, or only once the 1310 
pouches started? 1311 
Well, I don’t know.  I don’t know what—certainly I was told later on that Colby found my—he 1312 
thought my—because I not only put in hard, what I thought was hard information, but I thought it 1313 
important to put in the color or the atmosphere of what the situation was like, because they needed 1314 
to understand the conditions under which we were operating, and what were the nuances of what 1315 
was happening.  Because I felt we had a huge investment in this, and I think later on Colby said 1316 
those were probably the best things I did. 1317 
So perhaps that’s what got you the gig writing ‘Journey from Pha Dong’? 1318 
Maybe.  He knew I could write. 1319 
 1320 
(42:24)  For many of us, we can’t even imagine what it would be like— 1321 
[It is announced that dinner will be ready in five minutes] 1322 
—what it would be like to live out in the jungles of Laos pretty much alone, or just with 1323 
Tony, other than your Hmong companions, for what, almost two years? 1324 
Pretty much, yeah—a good part.  I would say it was two years. 1325 
What was that like?  I’m sure you could address that from a variety of perspectives, but for 1326 
those of us who have no idea, or perhaps the wrong idea— 1327 
Well, [Pauses] I had graduated from University with a severe—a tremendous appreciation of the 1328 
education I did not get.  I mean, I said to you earlier, I felt I was a privileged—I had a privileged 1329 
upbringing.  And one of the things that Laos did for me on a personal basis, for which I am forever 1330 
grateful, is make me understand just how dumb I was.  And to the extent that I have an education, it 1331 
was the nights I spent reading Toynbee, [Chuckles]—I had a deal with a book store in Washington 1332 
that they would send out books that I wanted, and I had worked out this rig—there was no 1333 
electricity, so I worked out this rig where I had candles, and I had taken the inside of tins, and 1334 
beaten them out so I had little reflector mirrors behind the candles.  And I would sit there for four 1335 
or five hours every night reading.  And I read by candle—you know, this is sort of a very Abraham 1336 
Lincoln idea.  [Interviewer chuckles]  And the books you see on our shelves in there that are 1337 
wrapped in brown paper are the ones that I brought back.  But I read a lot.  And I figured this was 1338 
an extraordinary experience that wasn’t going to happen to very many people, or to me ever again, 1339 
so I was going to make the best of it.  Yeah, it was lonely, but I had a dog, which I was very fond of, 1340 
and I had a lot of friends.  I really had good friends in the Thai group that was with me.  And I really 1341 
had a lot of good friends in the Hmong.  So was I lonely?  Sure!  I [Pauses] I didn’t get laid every 1342 
day, I had no ‘honey,’ which is probably a really good idea given what I did afterwards.  [Interviewer 1343 
chuckles]  You know, I just realized I was in a cocoon, and it was a cocoon that was very exciting, 1344 
and there were just hundreds of people who would have given their eye teeth to be where I was.  1345 
And I just lived, ate, slept, that whole experience.  I just thought, ‘You’re not going to get this one 1346 
again.’  I mean, I sort of knew in my senses, ‘This is not something you’re going to find [again].’  So 1347 
I [Pauses] I can’t really say that I was lonely at all.  The Hmong kept trying to give me women, 1348 
[Interviewer chuckles] and Jiggs Weldon was very clever, and he said, ‘Don’t go there.’  [Laughs]  1349 
‘Don’t go there’ And he said, ‘Medically, don’t go there.’  I saw a lot of guys with some various 1350 
forms of syphilis which weren’t very pleasant.  And politically, it really made no sense whatsoever.  1351 
Vang Pao would always say—he had five wives, and I said, ‘VP, if you give me one, I’m going to 1352 
have to take four others just to make everyone happy,’ and I said, ‘I can’t do that.’  So they called me 1353 
‘the Prince.’  That was Vang Pao’s word; he said, ‘You’re the Prince.’  I said, ‘What do you mean by 1354 
that?’  He said, ‘Well you don’t need what the rest of us need.’  [Interviewer laughs]  I said, ‘Well, 1355 
that’s not actually, strictly true!’  [Both laugh]  So there was a lot of sexual banter back and forth, but 1356 
I was pretty good.  I never touched a Hmong girl.  I saved all my lust for various houses in Udorn, 1357 
and luckily survived those.  But I really—I really found the whole—you know, you’d wake up—it 1358 
was an extraordinary place!  You wake up at four o’clock in the morning and you—the sun would 1359 
just be coming up, and you’d watch the women going up in the fields to work, and you’d hear the 1360 
sounds of the village, and you realized you had to go to this place, this place, this place, and you had 1361 
to check on that.  You just had a list of 50 things to do and you were only going to get through ten 1362 
of them.  And every day was like that, seven days a week.  So you didn’t have much time to be 1363 
lonely. 1364 
 1365 
(47:59)  You certainly weren’t bored. 1366 
You certainly weren’t bored, no. 1367 
 1368 
(48:03)  Well you mentioned the 22-foot tapeworm, and I think you said it was also close to 1369 
six months before you had any regular contact or maybe supplies dropped to you from 1370 
outside— 1371 
I think that’s right.  I mean—but that was where Father Bouchard came in.  See, I had the tapeworm 1372 
when I was still living in Vientiane.  And the reason I got the tapeworm was the very first night… 1373 
Oh, the steak tartar… 1374 
[Yes].  The Kobe beef from the back yard, which is a dumb-ass thing to do.  [Interviewer laughs]  1375 
And then it didn’t—they got—and when it all came out, it came out all except the head.  I mean, 1376 
that’s what tapeworms do.  If you get sick enough, it will just drop off what it doesn’t need.  And 1377 
then it starts to grow again.  And then I went through an American medically-approved method, 1378 
which was high doses of Atabrin, which turns you jaundiced—I mean, you turn yellow, your shit 1379 
turns white and your pee is dark.  And that didn’t work.  And then I go up country, and about 1380 
[Pauses] some time in the fall, I know it’s back in there.  And Father comes—stops in, ‘cause we 1381 
have this talk about— 1382 
 1383 
[Dinner is ready.  The recorder is turned off, new track begins] 1384 
 1385 
(0:00)  Well, we had left off with the story of Father Bouchard coming to your rescue, as I 1386 
recall.  [Anne Garrels laughs] 1387 
Yes.  Well, the good Father heard my case, and said he knew how to take care of it, but he had to go 1388 
visit some colleagues down south and he would return in a number of weeks, which he did, and he 1389 
gave me a little aluminum vial, tube, and at the bottom were eight tiny little black pills.  And he said, 1390 
‘Take one a day for the next week or so,’ and he said, ‘You’ll be cured.’  I did, and I was.  And I 1391 
don’t know this for a fact, but when Annie and I were walking around Angkor Wat a number of 1392 
years later, in ’99, we had a wonderful guide who was telling about the various trees and things like 1393 
that, and he was explaining about the use of strychnine, and the nut of the strychnine tree, and how, 1394 
if you want to kill someone, you basically give him the whole nut.  But its use in homeopathic 1395 
medicine was extensive.  And there was an entire science of how much you should be given for 1396 
whatever ails you.  And I suspect I was given a very small dose of strychnine.  And whatever it was, 1397 
it—that’s all supposition.  But he described what it looked like (because I got rather interested), and 1398 
it reminded me of what the pills were like that Father Bouchard gave me.  So that’s my little story of 1399 
Father Bouchard. 1400 
 1401 
(1:59)  Now we’ll get to the big event where you have to leave the country because you’re 1402 
sick a little down the road.  But just in general, were there other hazards of living out in the 1403 
jungle like that?   1404 
No, actually it was remarkably benign.  I mean, everyone thought my life was extremely hazardous in 1405 
general, and of course I never moved without a number of very fierce little tigers who went with me.  1406 
I remember—when I was explaining to you when I heard about Kennedy’s death, I was surrounded 1407 
by the toughest group of people I—no one was going to get to me.  And they liked—we got along 1408 
very well, and they were—obviously Vang Pao had given the word out that ‘This guy needs to be—1409 
you’d better—nothing should happen to him.’  And so I always had at least one or two with me no 1410 
matter where I went, and they just said, ‘We’re here to make sure that everything’s all right.’  The 1411 
food was really quite edible, was perfectly adequate. Clearly if you ate with Vang Pao you got the 1412 
best of what was offered.  It was very simple.  You ate soup, sticky rice, more soup, and more sticky 1413 
rice, and [Pauses] that was about it.  And it got you through.  But you got greens, and they were 1414 
awfully good, they were well-prepared.  And often—not always, but often, there were little bits of 1415 
some kind of meat floating around.  And so I lost a lot of weight.  I was, what with the—I am 200 1416 
pounds now; I was 40 pounds lighter [Interviewer whistles]—no, 35.  I came back at about 165, 170. 1417 
 1418 
(4:02)  On a 6’ 3” frame.   1419 
Yeah. 1420 
That’s pretty light. 1421 
Yeah.  Yeah.  But I think a lot of that had to do with the very—I got the hepatitis and other things.  1422 
But by and large it was adequate.  And I got pretty used to it, and the only thing I never got used to 1423 
was hot Thai sauce, so I never…[Interviewer laughs] 1424 
 1425 
(4:33)  Just rounding back for one second.  We were talking about these reports you wrote 1426 
that both Lair and Colby saw.  Did you ever get any feedback from Colby other than when 1427 
you saw him— 1428 
I got nothing—later on I got feedback that they had indeed been appreciated.  Annie, what was the 1429 
story—Sweetie?  When we were at the CIA reunion and that secretary comes up— 1430 
 1431 
AG:  [Laughs]  And she says, ‘Oh, you’re Vint Lawrence.’  She said, ‘I was the one who had to 1432 
transcribe all’—I mean, ‘and decode all of your messages.’  She said, ‘They were the longest anybody 1433 
in the Agency ever wrote!’  [Lawrence and interviewer laugh]  I mean, the word was out:  ‘If you’re 1434 
on, don’t get assigned to Vint Lawrence, because it will be pages upon pages upon pages!’ 1435 
 1436 
VL:  She was funny 1437 
 1438 
AG:  He was writing his doctoral dissertation without knowing it. 1439 
 1440 
VL:  Yeah. 1441 
 1442 
(5:37)  If only someone could have handed it all over to you.  Well, I suppose—you said you 1443 
kept copies of most of this, right? 1444 
VL:  Yes, I do.  Yeah.  By and large they’re very dated.   1445 
 1446 
AG:  Well, they’re very detailed. 1447 
 1448 
That makes them important historical artifacts, though. 1449 
VL:  Yeah.  They’re dated, and some day, if you have—if the Hmong Center—when I end up trying 1450 
to figure out where my remains and papers should go,— 1451 
 1452 
AG:  So to speak. 1453 
 1454 
VL:  I’ll send them out to you. 1455 
 1456 
(6:13)  Yeah, we’ll hope the ‘remains’ issue is a long, long, long-from-now question. 1457 
[Garrels laughs] 1458 
 1459 
VL:  No, but I mean, it’s been something—I don’t want to send them to the Agency, for god’s sake. 1460 
 1461 
(6:21)  No, I’m—I know they would be thrilled to have them.  In fact, I’ll leave you one of 1462 
my cards, and— 1463 
Sure. 1464 
No, they would, I’m sure— 1465 
When I’m in extremis, be sure to come back and get here before everyone else gets here. 1466 
All right.  Well, I’m sure— 1467 
I mean, I think that—I mean, it would be— 1468 
I have it on record now.  [Chuckling] 1469 
VL:  It would be— 1470 
 1471 
AG:  It would be a great place. 1472 
 1473 
VL:  No, it would be a great place to have it.  It would make sense. 1474 
 1475 
(6:43)  I was talking to you earlier about this ‘Evening with Bill Lair’ thing.  I think it would 1476 
be great if you came and conducted the conversation with him, if you’d be available.  I 1477 
mean, we haven’t—this is just an idea I have, it’s not gone any further than that. 1478 
AG:  I think it would be great. 1479 
But I think it’d be a brilliant evening. 1480 
VL:  Well, when are you doing the evening? 1481 
Like I said, it’s literally just an idea I had, and I talked to Bill Lair about it three days ago. 1482 
VL:  Uh-huh. 1483 
So I’ll take it home, and I’ll—I mean, Lee Pao would be insane not to— 1484 
VL:  Now what’s Lee Pao’s middle name? 1485 
Lee Pao Xiong. 1486 
VL:  He’s Lee Pao Xiong.  ‘Cause I knew a guy called Lee Vang Pao. 1487 
OK. 1488 
(***)  I don’t—you know, I—when we were in Bangkok, we met some of the Hmong who were 1489 
there.  I, with very, very, very few exceptions, those names and those faces have slipped, to be 1490 
honest with you. 1491 
 1492 
(7:46)  That’s quite all right.  [Pauses]  Well, I’d like to ask you about the event that’s 1493 
repeated more than once in Roger Warner’s book, and that you witnessed at least once, and 1494 
that’s the shooting of the moon. 1495 
Oh! 1496 
What was the story behind that, what cultural significance, if any, did you derive from it 1497 
once you talked to people about it?  And I seem to recall Tony Poe complained once that 1498 
you were wasting ammunition by giving the [Hmong bullets to engage in this ritual]. 1499 
Oh, I’m sure he did.  I’m sure.  But I suspect—it is perfectly conceivable that Tony was too hung 1500 
over, [Interviewer laughs]   and this was an ex post facto criticism. The irony for me was that 1501 
[Pauses] I had gotten—I had drunk—the night before, I had had—I had been at a baci [Hmong 1502 
string-tying ceremony] for somebody, I don’t remember who, and I had drunk very bad hard 1503 
liquor—rice wine.  And my face that morning—I could hardly see out of my eyes because I was 1504 
so—there’s a photograph of me somewhere, and I am just a horror, because my whole face is 1505 
puffed up like a balloon, and so I’m not seeing very well.  And about 11 o’clock, I notice it all getting 1506 
darker, and I think I’m losing my fucking mind, because everything else that day had gone pretty 1507 
badly.  And so it was with some relief that I—I had heard that this—that was the first eclipse I had 1508 
experienced out there.  And so it did get dark, and—it wasn’t a full eclipse, but it was three-quarters 1509 
partial.  So it got pretty dark.  And then the firing started.  But by that time, I knew what was 1510 
happening, and I knew what was going to happen, so the shooting at the moon or shooting at the 1511 
eclipse or the sun was—it was just a great cultural event.  And so the sun came back and we all 1512 
plodded on our day, as I recall. 1513 
 1514 
AG:  And your eyesight returned.   1515 
 1516 
VL:  And my eyesight returned, but not that quickly, as I recall.  [Interviewer chuckles]  But, of 1517 
course, the moon or the sun had spirits, and if you scared the spirits away—I think it was 1518 
theoretically a frog, or something like that [that was consuming the moon/sun and needed to be 1519 
scared off with gunfire] 1520 
 1521 
(10:26)  Yeah, that’s what I recall., yeah. 1522 
A huge frog eats it and you scare it away, and then everything’s all right. 1523 
 1524 
AG:  I want to ask a question that I think would make— 1525 
 1526 
[Interviewer more than happily cedes the questioning to Anne Garrels] 1527 
 1528 
—to get at his perceptions, because a lot of the questions that he’s been asked a million times, and 1529 
he’s—you know…But when you first get up there and live with the Hmong, what are your first 1530 
impressions? 1531 
 1532 
VL:  My first impressions…Well, it’s a—you know, I’m enormously chuffed.  I mean, here I am, this 1533 
young kid.  I passed the Bill Lair, Tony Poe, Vang Pao, Pat Landry tests.  I’ve been given an 1534 
enormous, incredible sort of— 1535 
 1536 
AG:  But why have you passed the Vang Pao test? 1537 
 1538 
VL:  Well, ‘cause he let me come.  He— 1539 
 1540 
AG:  But why did he let you come?  Go back earlier, then. 1541 
 1542 
VL:  Well, I think he lets me come because I’m the best of a bad lot, to be honest with you.  1543 
[Hillmer chuckles]  I mean, I speak French, I was relatively personable, I think.  We get along, and 1544 
he thought, ‘Well, I can work with this kid.’  But I’m a kid—you know, I’m 22 years old. 1545 
 1546 
AG:  But when you first meet the Hmong—I mean, whatever that means. 1547 
 1548 
VL:  When I first meet the Hmong. 1549 
 1550 
AG:  What’s your first encounter with—not just—I mean, Vang Pao is one thing, and the Hmong, 1551 
as— 1552 
 1553 
VL:  OK, the Hmong strike me as a truly [Pauses] esoteric, wild, marvelous group of people.  I 1554 
mean, the men are extraordinarily handsome, but in a very carved, Oriental manner.  They obviously 1555 
have incredible endurance, they’re incredibly strong, they’re very slight—I mean, they’re not big 1556 
people by a long shot, but they’re large—but you would see occasionally six-foot—there were 1557 
Hmong who were six feet, and just extraordinarily beautiful people, and unbelievably stoic.  And 1558 
they’d gone through all kinds of stuff, and I thought, ‘Gosh, maybe I can be of help here,’ so…  I 1559 
was going to be there for two years, and— 1560 
 1561 
AG:  Where was—what was your first meeting with them? 1562 
 1563 
VL:  My first meeting?  [Pauses]  Well, my first meeting of seeing Hmong in village was probably in 1564 
Pha Khao, where it was the first headquarters.  And then we moved over to Long Cheng, and I ran 1565 
into my first group of truly—well, you might say ‘wild Hmong.’ 1566 
 1567 
AG:  What do you mean by that? 1568 
 1569 
VL:  Well, these were people, these were farmers who lived in this isolated valley, this Shangri-La of 1570 
a valley, isolated from the war, isolated form other tribes and other Hmong, leading a very quiet 1571 
agricultural life.  They had a—everyone had animals and they had, they were growing crops.  It just 1572 
struck me as being [Pause] close—very idyllic in many ways.  I mean, this—it met, if you will, a 1573 
Westerner’s preconception of what mountain people in Southeast Asia should look like and what 1574 
they should be doing.  Now that all changed very quickly.  Those families, those 14 families or 14 1575 
people who lived in that valley were quickly subsumed by all the rest of us who moved in en masse.  1576 
So I don’t—you know, I’m not sure I ever—four years later I recognized any of the original 1577 
inhabitants, ‘cause it was 45,000 people. 1578 
 1579 
AG:  My last question, at least that I’ve got is—I mean, I know when you would walk through Long 1580 
Cheng,—  1581 
VL:  Yes. 1582 
AG:  —when it grew up— 1583 
VL:  Yes. 1584 
AG:  How do you think the people in Long Cheng looked at you?  Who did they think you were? 1585 
 1586 
VL:  I think they saw me as Vang Pao’s special friend, and I was accorded extraordinary—I was 1587 
greeted… [Pauses]  And I knew a lot of them by name.  It’s sort of like walking around Norfolk.  1588 
[Hillmer chuckles, having followed Lawrence and his dogs on a walk around the neighborhood that 1589 
afternoon.] 1590 
 1591 
AG:  How many people were in there—but in Long Cheng, at the end? 1592 
 1593 
VL:  [There] were forty [-five thousand]—but the 45,000, there was an enormous refugee 1594 
community to the east of the town, that I rarely went to, and they were mostly not Hmong, they 1595 
were Lao Theung.  So when I would go through the Hmong village, I would recognize faces, and I 1596 
would recognize a few of them, but they would all come up and we’d have—they were always asking 1597 
me, they were always trying to push—you know, free meals, free women, free anything.  They were 1598 
always—they always wanted to give me gifts.  I could have lived in the village and never paid for a 1599 
thing.  ‘Cause I think they felt that I had—I was somewhat responsible for the fact that they were all 1600 
relatively safe. 1601 
 1602 
AG:  You didn’t get a sense that there were people in that—of course, I’m coming out of 1603 
Baghdad—that there were people in that village who wanted to stab you in the back? 1604 
 1605 
VL:  No.  Absolutely not.  I never, never once had that suspicion.  Never.  Never.  Never.  I never 1606 
watched my back.  I never had to watch my back.  Didn’t have that worry at all.  Now, I don’t know 1607 
what would have happened if I’d been—stayed another two years.  I don’t know.  I’m not sure. 1608 
 1609 
AG:  Excuse me. 1610 
 1611 
Oh, thank you very much!  Stop by again any time!  [Chuckles] 1612 
[Anne Garrels leaves the room] 1613 
 1614 
(17:07)  Now, there are stories going back to the days of the French that the Hmong also 1615 
moved remarkably quickly through the jungle, especially for people of their size.  Did you 1616 
ever observe—? 1617 
Yes.  The Hmong could walk through the jungle faster than anybody I knew.  They had—at least 1618 
the actual, the real local, local people who never wore shoes, their little toes, genetically, had moved 1619 
from a point of being parallel to the other toes to being almost at a right angle.  So they—when they 1620 
went up a trail, their toes were virtually prehensile, and they would grab---they would grab—and 1621 
then, of course the trails were slick and muddy and all that, and they could move up a trail with a 1622 
speed that was truly frightening, whereas the rest of us were wearing boots that got clogged and wet 1623 
and soggy.  It was amazing how they could walk.  And they would walk for days.  And they would 1624 
chew on opium leaves or chew on opium seeds, if they didn’t smoke it.  And that gave them a very 1625 
nice—I mean, to eat, to chew opium seeds at the end of a long day’s march really acted like a—1626 
better than Advil.  It just kind of calmed you down, and you slept very well. 1627 
 1628 
(18:39)  There’s been a lot written about the role of the opium economy,  1629 
[Yes] 1630 
from a social, from a cultural, from a political, from an economic perspective.  From your 1631 
experience with the Hmong, how do you think students of the subject—anyone interested 1632 
in opium’s role in that society should best understand it? 1633 
Cultivation of opium is both labor-intensive and space-expansive.  To get a good crop of opium, 1634 
you need a really nice, good field that has been—that has been cultivated and prepared.  Those 1635 
fields—and they prefer if I’m not—I think I’m right—they prefer a gentle hillside.  They don’t like 1636 
to be down on the flat [land], and they don’t—they don’t really grow well high up in the mountains 1637 
where it is precipitous.  That land was the land that existed between the Hmong, in their traditional 1638 
locations around the Plaines de Jarres, and the Plaines de Jarres itself.  It was that land which was the 1639 
best opium-growing land.  That land was lost to the war.  That was sort of the first thing that the 1640 
Vietnamese took over, so that much of the really prime opium-growing land was lost.  There was 1641 
opium—of course there was opium grown.  There was opium grown right behind my house, in fact, 1642 
in Long Cheng.  But the guy and the family who worked it, who I presume were one of the first—1643 
the old settlers of Long Cheng—they worked that field extremely hard to prepare it and get it seeded 1644 
and all that sort of thing.  So, of course, the Hmong traded opium, but the Plaines de Jarres was 1645 
thought to be the best opium land in Laos.  The best opium land in Laos, if I understand it correctly, 1646 
was up in the Yao country in the northwest corner.  Why it’s the best, I don’t know, but that’s what 1647 
I was told.  So you had a society and a group of people who made a lot—they were superb 1648 
herdsmen.  They made a lot of money running cattle.  They also had access to silver mines, and they 1649 
also had access to opium.  When the Plain falls and everyone comes our way, you lose the opium 1650 
fields, you lose a lot of the cattle, and certainly you lose the access to the silver, which is in the Nong 1651 
Het plateau, which is where most—where we—I never found out where those silver mines were.  1652 
No one would ever tell me.  All I was told—they were in Nong Het.  Well, of course I didn’t get to 1653 
Nong Het, because it was under Vietnamese control.  So where those were, I don’t know if I’d had 1654 
access to Nong Het if I would have been shown them.  It was very closely guarded.  I don’t believe 1655 
there was any silver mined in the areas that we controlled for the four years I was there.  Opium—if 1656 
you recall the film, Vang Pao was quite adamant about opium—that his people should not and could 1657 
not—he couldn’t trust soldiers who smoked opium.  And I won’t say that he threw a soldier out 1658 
who smoked opium, but there were clear examples of what happened to you if you did use excessive 1659 
amounts of opium.  He himself never touched the stuff.  He didn’t smoke.  He would drink 1660 
occasionally—yeah, he drank.  Sure, he drank.  But—so the issue of opium trading, I’m sure did 1661 
exist, and I’m sure Touby Lyfoung and the Ly [Lee] family were the recipients of largely Vang Pao’s 1662 
private deal that, in effect, if Touby Lyfoung wouldn’t make political or military trouble for him, 1663 
he’d let Touby trade in anything he wanted.  What Touby traded in—I would just make the 1664 
assumption that it was opium, among other things.  But you’re still not talking on a huge scale.  1665 
You’re talking on quite a reduced scale, and you’re also talking… [Pauses]  You’re also talking that 1666 
this was simply raw opium and not processed opium, ‘cause it went out of the north country and 1667 
was processed in the labs near Vientiane. 1668 
 1669 
(24:35)  Would it be fair to say that there’s been a lot of hay made without much 1670 
justification, necessarily, about alleged links between Air America flying Hmong people 1671 
around the country and representatives of Air America supposedly participating in the 1672 
opium trade? 1673 
I heard a lot of that stuff.  Do I have any direct knowledge? Would I have likely had knowledge of 1674 
it?  Probably not.  By the time I think that occurs… 1675 
 1676 
[Pours some wine, offers some to Interviewer, who accepts, and Lawrence goes to retrieve a wine 1677 
glass.  Recorder turned off, new track begins.] 1678 
 1679 
(0:03)  You know, when Long Cheng gets bigger, there are Americans and Thais running the airport.  1680 
I basically had nothing—very little to do with that.  Planes come in, people get on them, planes take 1681 
off.  Was it Air America, was it Bird and Son, was it Vang Pao’s airline?  Did I stand at the door and 1682 
check everyone’s baggage? No.  Do I suspect that certain people—a number of people were carrying 1683 
opium in small bundles?  Absolutely.  Do I think that perhaps there were certain Air America pilots 1684 
or American pilots flying for whatever airline that were knowingly carrying opium from Nam Tha 1685 
up in the north to Vientiane?  Wouldn’t surprise me at all.  Did I know of any of it actually 1686 
happening?  Did I see it?  No.  Did I look for it?  Probably not as hard as I should have.  Especially 1687 
the Nam Tha stuff, I wouldn’t have known about, anyway, ‘cause that wouldn’t have come through 1688 
Long Cheng.  Did I go through the business as I mentioned earlier, of checking with Vang Pao as to 1689 
the amount of raw opium he had under his house at any given time?  Yes.  I think a lot is made of it, 1690 
and I’m not going to—I have no way of denying it or corroborating it, because most of it simply 1691 
bypasses me.  And frankly, [Pauses] you know, maybe I should have been more concerned that the 1692 
ultimate user end of this thing was some kid in Baltimore who was killing a cop to get this stuff.  I 1693 
was maybe not as aware of where it all ended up as I might have been. 1694 
Sure.  Well, it was very early in that period. 1695 
It was early, but I certainly was—it wasn’t on my radar screen, except in an operational sense of 1696 
what it meant for Vang Pao. 1697 
 1698 
(2:33)  Did you know many of the Air America pilots well—especially the people who tend to 1699 
end up being mentioned in books a lot like Ron Sutphin, or Fred Walker? 1700 
Rarely.  I knew a lot of the helio pilots, the small engine pilots.  They were not the big guys.  I knew 1701 
none—I remember one night in Udorn I went out with Bill, and there was a—I can’t remember 1702 
what his name was, but he was a famous Air America C-46 pilot.  Now C-46s would never land, 1703 
couldn’t land where we were, and so the whole mystique of Air America and the pilots largely went 1704 
literally over my head.  Bill Andresevic, who was the chief helio courier pilot was a friend, and is a 1705 
friend to this day.  Ed Dearborn, whom I knew quite well, was a—flew Caribous.  But the pilots 1706 
were not—you know, they weren’t my main concern.  I didn’t—I’m not a guy who likes to sit in 1707 
bars and talk war stories.  [Interviewer chuckles]  So I didn’t do it—you know, I didn’t do it in 1708 
Vientiane for the first few months; I never did it in Udorn.  And when I go to this Sky reunion in 1709 
Montana a couple of years ago, guys would come up to me and say, ‘You know, I was so-and-so, 1710 
and I would—I did all the rice drops’ or ‘I did all that.’  And they’re all good people, but I didn’t 1711 
know who they were.  And they said, ‘Well, we know who you are.’  And I said, ‘Well yeah, but my 1712 
concern was not with you dropping the rice.  My concern was the people on the ground.’  So there 1713 
was a real disconnect.  There were some—and Tony was better at this than I was.  Tony’s 1714 
personality appealed to these guys who left Alaska ‘cause—the Alaska bush pilots who had come 1715 
and who left Alaska ‘cause it got too populated.  They were quite a breed of cat, these guys.  And I 1716 
respected them and liked some of them, and brought the body home of one of them who was a very 1717 
good friend, but I can’t say that , with the exception of Bill Andresevic, who—we talk every six 1718 
months or so—I’ve kept in touch with any of them.  They have a different—and I don’t think Jerry 1719 
Daniels was actually a pilot.  I think he was actually—started out as a kicker and then he morphed 1720 
into an Agency person, and became quite beloved—not that I’m—I’m not trying to take anything 1721 
away from Jerry.  And Stu Methven, I don’t think—I don’t think he was a pilot, either.  Methven, I 1722 
think, was an old Agency employee, and Daniels became one.  So, just to correct the record… 1723 
 1724 
(6:37)  OK.  I appreciate that.  Before we move on, we were discussing over supper that it’s 1725 
difficult for an American audience to get a sense of Vang Pao’s role, and particularly to 1726 
judge how ‘corrupt’ he was in an appropriate context.  Would you offer any advice to those 1727 
who may want to use their moral compass or their moral measuring stick to judge Vang Pao 1728 
as a leader in Laos during this period? 1729 
I think [Phone rings] I personally feel what happened to Vang Pao is pretty tragic.  I look with great 1730 
sorrow at a man who I felt was pretty close to everything America was looking for in a region and in 1731 
Vietnam all the way through Cambodia and Thailand, was crying out for energetic and far-sighted 1732 
leadership and he—and charismatic leadership.  This guy was truly charismatic.  [Pauses]  Age hits 1733 
these people early.  Vang Pao was about 35 when I knew him—35, early 30s.  And by 50, that life 1734 
takes a terrible toll on people.  [Pauses]  And I watched Touby Lyfoung, for example, who had been 1735 
a hero in the French resistance to the Japanese, and here was a hugely corpulent, hugely 1736 
untrustworthy human being, who clearly had sold every principle he had.  What happened to Vang 1737 
Pao in this country, I just think is a tragedy more of the event than the man, but I think the ultimate 1738 
result is that the man has been wounded irreparably.  And my sense is that it will take a long time 1739 
before—within the Hmong community—he’ll be seen in his proper light, because as you said, you 1740 
go to St. Paul you either love him or you hate him, and a lot of it depends on how old you are.  1741 
And—yeah, I’m sure he made mistakes, and I’m sure that after I left, he became enamored of the 1742 
toys of war.  And I think he made a mistake, but I think the Americans made that mistake real easy 1743 
to make.  And my only real argument with Bill has ever been—was the part that we played in 1744 
fostering that.  And it’s not much of an argument, ‘cause he said it was—you know, I think he saw it 1745 
one way—he saw the training of the Hmong to be pilots as a gesture of their status within the 1746 
world.  And I don’t argue that point.  My worry was whether that emboldened Vang Pao to think in 1747 
terms that he had not heretofore thought in.  And I don’t—and to this day, I wonder whether, had I 1748 
stayed for another tour, and I saw the militarization and the conventionalization of the Hmong, 1749 
whether I would have had the balls to resign.  I should—‘cause I should have.  And I don’t know, 1750 
‘cause I never had to face that question. And I know it caused a great deal of anguish among some 1751 
of the older hands who thought this was a road to disaster, and it turned out to be just that. 1752 
 1753 
(11:16)  Do you have a sense at all—and I realize this is probably not more than a guess, 1754 
but—that Touby Lyfoung was jealous of this boy who had been his emissary to the 1755 
Japanese in years gone past, who was rising up the ranks and becoming this charismatic 1756 
leader who was getting all the press and— 1757 
All of the above and then some. 1758 
How so? 1759 
Well, [Pauses] Touby was—Touby played his games with the French very nicely, and he was picked 1760 
over Faydang Lo [to receive the title of tasseng], right?  So he was the golden boy for the French.  My 1761 
guess is that Touby never was much—he was never the fighter that Vang Pao was.  He never had 1762 
Vang Pao’s reputation as a superb tactician, and somebody who lived and quite preferred a simple 1763 
life.  My guess is that Touby saw an opening and grabbed it and took it, and then thought he had the 1764 
Hmong under his control only to discover that unless he was out there in the field leading the 1765 
troops, old VP was going to come by and usurp him.  So I think Vang Pao, in his brilliant, tactical 1766 
way, as he was early on, went to him and they made a deal, where Touby would back off, Touby 1767 
would let Vang Pao have the military establishment.  Touby would get the commercial 1768 
establishment, and the political establishment they would talk about.  But basically, I think Vang Pao 1769 
had the last word. 1770 
 1771 
(13:16)  Now I think Jane Hamilton-Merritt suggests that there was a plot to kill Vang Pao 1772 
that was at least supposedly initiated by Touby Lyfoung. 1773 
I heard that.  But I would put that in the realm of ‘which side did you get it from, and did you talk to 1774 
the—did you look at the countervailing arguments?’  I would be [Pauses] I have no way of knowing 1775 
yes or know.  All I know is after four years out there, I knew enough that if I heard something, I 1776 
would need to go to somebody who was going to tell me the—180 degrees the opposite, and then 1777 
weigh the two of them and try to figure out which one was playing games with the other.  So I—and 1778 
even Vang Pao was not above using—spreading the rumor that Touby was out to assassinate him.  1779 
So where the truth is, I don’t have any idea. 1780 
 1781 
(14:23)  A name that comes up, but not a whole lot is said about him is [Prince] Sai Kham.  1782 
Did you have any dealings with him at all? 1783 
No, I’m afraid he’s one of the names that has receded into the mists of history.  I’m sure that I knew 1784 
him or knew about him when I was there, but to be honest with you, if I said anything about him 1785 
now, it would just be bullshit. 1786 
[Laughing] Fair enough.   1787 
 1788 
(14:54)  Do you think the King’s visit in December of ’63 to Long Cheng was a significant or 1789 
perhaps more ceremonial step in the attempt to integrate the Hmong into the broader 1790 
Laotian society and national identity? 1791 
Good question.  I personally think it was a huge success.  It would be hard not—for even such a 1792 
phlegmatic individual as the King, who seemed never to know—I mean, he was absolutely 1793 
expressionless the entire time—this huge, rumbling old fart.  But to see him get off the royal aircraft, 1794 
and to have—I don’t know, was it a 5,000-foot runway?  A thousand-foot runway—whatever it was, 1795 
it was a long runway.  And every single—the entire runway lined with kids waving Laotian flags—on 1796 
their knees. 1797 
 1798 
(16:06)  Oh my!  I hadn’t heard that detail. 1799 
Oh.  You know, maybe that didn’t mean much to the old guy, but I believe that it did.  Now what 1800 
that meant for him when he goes back to LP [Luang Prabang], and what that meant within the 1801 
politics of Laos, I don’t know, because I don’t—I’m not privy to that.  But I think that had a huge 1802 
effect on him alone, because I don’t think he—if I understood what other people said, what other 1803 
celebrations for the King amounted to, they were rather patchy, shall we say.  And this was an 1804 
impressive deal.  So can I point to tangible results as a result of the visit?  No.  Can I say that all of a 1805 
sudden—the generals in Vientiane all of a sudden thought Vang Pao was a great guy and they 1806 
promoted him?  I’d have to work on that. [Interviewer chuckles]  Do I think it had an effect?  Yes.  1807 
Precisely what that effect was, I’m not sure. 1808 
 1809 
(17:33)  Now was it Bill Lair or—do you have any idea of who it was who was placing 1810 
pressure on the King to promote Vang Pao up the ranks? 1811 
It wouldn’t have been the King. 1812 
Oh, OK. 1813 
It wouldn’t have been the King, because the King, I think, had very little temporal power.  This 1814 
would have been whichever generals were running—either the neutralist government, or then, after 1815 
the coup, a right-wing government out of Vientiane.  So I—and that [Pauses] I don’t know who was 1816 
putting the pressure on.  I suspect it wasn’t Lair.  If it was anybody, it would have been the 1817 
Ambassador and the Chief of Station in Vientiane, because Bill—remember, Bill does not go to 1818 
Vientiane. 1819 
True enough. 1820 
He’s pretty much an Udorn guy.  And he’s a back room player.  He doesn’t go, and I don’t think 1821 
he—I don’t think he’s on an easy, one-to-one relationship with the guys who are running the 1822 
government at all.  So… 1823 
 1824 
(19:04)  I think I misunderstood, because I think the King did pin his stars on his uniform, 1825 
or whatever, after he was promoted to general. 1826 
He may well have done that, and I suspect that was a staged event.  Maybe he got the promotion, 1827 
and maybe—and it is perfectly possible—because I really can’t tell you whether when you got to 1828 
become a general whether that was symbolically done by the King.  That may well have been.  You 1829 
see, I don’t know.  I don’t know what the Lao military ritual was. 1830 
 1831 
(19:36)  Fair enough.  Like I said, I ask lots of questions that probably aren’t fair to ask. 1832 
Yeah. 1833 
Again, if I remember correctly, once there was this withdrawal of Americans after the 1834 
Geneva Accords were enforced, there was a period in which the enemy made some relatively 1835 
significant gains, was it not, at least for a time?—but that it was also a time in which Vang 1836 
Pao was starting to become more effective in recruiting more Hmong, and people were 1837 
coming in, and he having to sort of figure out who was just in it for the pots and pans and 1838 
food, and who was in it because they really wanted to fight for him and for the Hmong 1839 
people. 1840 
Yeah. 1841 
Did you see a significant change in the way—I think you said earlier in his career, people 1842 
just walked up and berated him and treated him with no deference whatsoever, and that 1843 
people had no compunction about just dressing him down if they thought he’d done 1844 
something wrong.  Was his standing in the community changing?   Was his— 1845 
Well, I think he always had that—like any really good leader, he always invited— 1846 
 1847 
[A friend drops by to see Anne Garrels and passes through] 1848 
 1849 
Vang Pao and the Hmong always, no matter how high you were, had a very democratic way of 1850 
dealing with each other.  There was nobody, no matter how high you were, that you were above 1851 
being berated by some farmer who just was pissed off at you.  [Interviewer chuckles]  I mean, that 1852 
was one of the really, really nice things about the Hmong.  They didn’t mind who you were.  You 1853 
put your pants on one leg at a time like everybody else, and if they had a gripe, they’d come after 1854 
you.  So that quality—that quality never failed Vang Pao, as long as I was with him.  [Pauses]  What 1855 
was the other part [of the question]? 1856 
 1857 
(21:51)  Was there [Pauses] was there a challenge that came along with all of these potential 1858 
Hmong recruits coming in terms of arming them,— 1859 
No. 1860 
—figuring out what their motives were—? 1861 
No, this was—that’s a good question.  What we got during the hiatus period—oh, you were asking 1862 
about the activity—because it was quite complicated.  You have the Geneva Convention, you have a 1863 
titular, neutral—Souvanna Phouma comes in, and he installs Kong Le, who is a titularly neutral 1864 
army—what is left of the neutral army—on a position in the Plaines de Jarres.  [Pauses]  And 1865 
therefore you have three groups sort of milling around in the PDJ.  I don’t recall [Pauses] any really 1866 
significant gains made by the Pathet Lao-slash-Vietnamese or the Neutralists other than the 1867 
exchange of some towns on the eastern edge of the Plaines de Jarres.  It was the attack by the—of 1868 
the Pathet Lao-slash-Vietnamese on the Neutralist forces maybe a year or 14 months into this that 1869 
sort of caused the whole thing to blow up again.  And I don’t know—Vang Pao was always very 1870 
leery of dealing with Kong Le because he feels he can’t trust him.  We get a lot of people coming 1871 
and wishing to join Vang Pao during this period, all of whom—most of whom we have a very hard 1872 
time getting any weapons for, because, if I remember correctly, we are in the business of replacing 1873 
weapons, but not adding to our overall force structure.  So there were a lot of folks who came in to 1874 
talk to Vang Pao that we just basically had to say, ‘Go home.  Let us know where you are.’ And I 1875 
can’t—I’m sure VP slipped them a rifle or two, but in the sense of any substantial increase of our 1876 
group, of our little oufit, there was very little.  That only started to occur after the fall of the 1877 
neutralists leaving the Plaines de Jarres in 1963 sometime—spring of ’63, or something like that—1878 
fall of ’63. 1879 
 1880 
(25:16)  When I talked to Dick Secord, which I was only able to do through the graces of 1881 
Heine Aderholt—he just happened to be passing through—he, I’m sure in hyperbolic 1882 
fashion, said, ‘There was no such thing as the Pathet Lao.  We would have given our eye 1883 
teeth to actually capture a Pathet Lao.  It was all the North Vietnamese. 1884 
That’s not true. 1885 
Is there a grain of truth in there, or do you think the Pathet Lao or the sort of Lao portion of 1886 
the communist infiltration of the country… 1887 
Well, I think it is absolutely true that behind any Pathet Lao unit—there was probably a Vietnamese 1888 
unit behind them.  So it was a little bit—they were between a rock and a hard place, usually.  But 1889 
certainly [Pauses] the numbers—and I don’t know how many companies Faydang Lo brought to the 1890 
table, but those guys fought just like VP’s people.  They were not patsies at all.  I think increasingly 1891 
[Pauses] the Pathet Lao was a kind of ineffectual force, because the Vietnamese didn’t trust them, 1892 
and the people didn’t like them, and they were used sort of as occupation groups that would come in 1893 
after the Vietnamese took some place.  So, you know [Pauses] what numbers am I talking about?  1894 
No idea.  But I don’t think it’s fair—I don’t think it’s accurate to say there were not units of one 1895 
form or another who were all Lao fighting for a communist takeover. 1896 
 1897 
(27:27)  Sure.  So the day comes—you get hepatitis, you’re deathly ill, you get flown to 1898 
Udorn and then on to Bangkok, and you’re out for—was it two months, something like that? 1899 
Well, I’m actually better in days [Pauses] and my friend Mike Lynch, who was in the next bed 1900 
[Pauses] 1901 
Wounded, or…? 1902 
No, he has hepatitis, too. 1903 
Oh, my goodness. 1904 
Terrible, dry—it’s just simply fecal hepatitis, whatever that number is—Hepatitis A.  And you get 1905 
terrible dust storms.  At that point our hut was sitting right at the end of the runway, so whatever 1906 
plane was going to take off would just coat everything in dust.  Initially my numbers were worse 1907 
than Mike’s, but I—my numbers improve rapidly and Mike’s do not, because I have two years of 1908 
immunity built up to it and he had months, he didn’t have the years.  So my problem is that I’m fine 1909 
to go back, but medically they won’t let me.  And in fact what they do medically is they say, ‘you’ve 1910 
got to go home and be checked out by a doctor at home and then you can come back.’  So I don’t 1911 
know if it’s two—I don’t remember if it was two months or a month and a half or whatever.  I go 1912 
home and I—a bunch of doctors at Langley look at me and I say I’m fine and they take my tests and 1913 
they say, ‘Jesus, you’re clean as a whistle.’ [Interviewer chuckles]  ‘Can I go back?’  And they say, 1914 
‘Well, you’d better stay around, because we don’t know what’—I mean, they don’t know what 1915 
they’re looking at.  And this is very early on in tropical medicine, and so I think I’m—what do I do?  1916 
It’s 1964, it’s the convention, I’m with my family when Johnson gets re-nominated… 1917 
 1918 
(29:47)  Or just nominated… 1919 
Or nominated.  [Pauses]  Nominated for the first time, yeah.  So I’m there for the summer, I’m here 1920 
for the summer.  I think I go back in August.  I don’t know what—I can’t—I’m not here for very 1921 
long. 1922 
 1923 
(30:06)  Do you remember taking any opportunities to sort of reflect on your experience and 1924 
think about what you wanted to do when you got back or what situations you might face, or 1925 
was it more that you were just glad to be out of there and glad to feel all right and happy to 1926 
visit your family…? 1927 
Pretty much that.  I didn’t have any—I knew I had to go back, I knew I wanted to go back.  You 1928 
know, a year earlier my parents had come out to Bangkok to see me, and I was way, way—way up in 1929 
northern Plaines de Jarres with (***) operation, and they were cooling their heels in Bangkok.  And 1930 
it was a tough time.  I think we got hit a couple of times.  And so I got out of the jungle and so flew 1931 
directly to Bangkok, and it turned out that my father, during World War II, had been a great 1932 
friend—was a classmate and an OSS mate of a guy named Jim Thompson, who was the one who 1933 
resurrected the silk industry of Thailand.  And he lived in this palatial, wonderful house, right on a 1934 
beautiful (***) in Bangkok.  And I walked in virtually in my jungle clothes, and there were my 1935 
parents, and they were seated at the end of a long, beautifully polished hall of a remodeled Thai 1936 
temple.  And there was Mr. Thompson dressed in silken whites, and my mother looking very cool, 1937 
and they were—and so I was introduced, and I sat down.  I will never forget the sight—it must have 1938 
been 35 feet down the other end—of the servants coming to the door, then dropping to their knees, 1939 
and coming across the floor on their knees to ask me if I’d like a gin and tonic. 1940 
Oh my goodness! 1941 
[Both laugh]  So that was sort of fun.  Quite a juxtaposition of…So anyway, [Pauses] I thought I was 1942 
important, and I thought that I really wanted to go back and so I did. 1943 
 1944 
(32:42)  I know it was a relatively brief time, but had there been any changes or 1945 
developments that you recall noticing in that brief time when you returned? 1946 
Not that I know of—not that I can remember.  I think everybody was happy to see me, but I 1947 
can’t—you know, they didn’t—the runway wasn’t lined with little kids holding flags, let’s put it that 1948 
way.  [Interviewer laughs] 1949 
 1950 
(33:03)  Another name that I just recently picked up and I think this was Roger’s book too, 1951 
and I’d never come across his name—was Vongrasamy Thong—if that name sounds 1952 
familiar at all—if it doesn’t we’ll just move on, that’s— 1953 
Yeah, I have no idea who he’s talking about. 1954 
OK.  I think he was one of Vang Pao’s lieutenants, did a lot of traveling with him, wore an 1955 
amulet.  He wasn’t Hmong. 1956 
I don’t know.  The name is not familiar, and I may have known him, and I probably did, but I 1957 
don’t—‘cause I knew all of Vang Pao’s lieutenants, but I can’t remember that one. 1958 
 1959 
(33:45)  By ’64 going into ’65, was there a growing American presence in terms of more CIA, 1960 
more undercover people who were trying to exert and influence and provide air support and 1961 
do all these other things? 1962 
Well, I think [Pauses] through much of ’65 Bill Sullivan was still the ambassador.  And as long as 1963 
Sullivan was the ambassador, he was going to keep a pretty tight lid on that, and as far as I know. 1964 
[Pauses] Yes, there was, there was—let’s see.  We got… [Pauses to remember] There was myself, 1965 
there was my assistant, John Randall, there was this god-forsaken person who—who was briefly 1966 
advisor to the radio station until I could get rid of him.  [Pauses]  There was a retired army colonel 1967 
who would come named Floyd something or other, who was a sweet man, and he would come and 1968 
try to help with the training, but he was sort of ineffectual.  There were a lot of ineffectual—because 1969 
in part the operation attracted—was both a dumping ground for failed operatives in other 1970 
endeavors, and also became a place where, because it was successful, various bureaucratic, 1971 
competing components of the Agency vied to get their own people into.  So I often was given 1972 
people that I didn’t need or didn’t want.  I felt I was perfectly capable of running this thing pretty 1973 
much on my own—a trait I’ve continued on ‘til this day.  [Interviewer chuckles]  And I got angry 1974 
that I ended up doing so much babysitting, because a lot of the guys who came had troubles and 1975 
problems, and it was basically theoretically my job to spend time and find out what was wrong.  1976 
Then we got—Mike Lynch went up country.  He was out of Sam Neua.  Mike did a very good job.  1977 
He was a fine officer. 1978 
 1979 
(36:31)  I think about the only thing that’s been written, at least for public consumption, 1980 
about him was his presence at Na Khang and his heroism there. 1981 
Yeah, and of course the big thing is that Mike—I think a lot of why nothing has been written is 1982 
because he stayed in the Agency for a long time afterwards. 1983 
 1984 
(36:51)  Well, if I am fortunate enough… 1985 
If you get to see him, please give him my best.  I saw him briefly at some function—one of the few 1986 
that I go to—and I am… 1987 
What should I know about him? 1988 
He was a good officer.  I think of Mike as being…[Pauses]  He and I were very similar.  I mean, we 1989 
kind of—we took risks, we liked the people.  He didn’t have—he hadn’t had the years, the time that 1990 
I had there.  And he didn’t have the quiet, that kind of incubating, quiet time to begin with, where 1991 
you really kind of got—you had the time to get to know who your people were.  I mean, so often, 1992 
like any other military person, you get dropped into a situation and you’ve got to work fast and 1993 
you’ve got take what’s handed to you, and then you go.  But Mike was a good officer. 1994 
 1995 
(38:00)  I don’t think I knew a thing about him, and Secord mentioned him and—I don’t 1996 
know the man particularly well, but he strikes me as the kind of person who isn’t given to 1997 
easy praise. 1998 
Secord? 1999 
Yeah. 2000 
I don’t know him at all, and I’m sure you’re right.  [Interviewer chuckles] 2001 
But he just said, ‘And Mike Lynch was a helluva soldier,’ and there was this tone of 2002 
reverence in his voice that made me think— 2003 
Well, Mike was!  I think he probably was a better soldier than I was.  I mean, I think he was—and he 2004 
was in a much hotter situation. 2005 
 2006 
(38:31) Well, we’ve already talked about Colby’s visit and his announcement to you that you 2007 
weren’t going to re-up for a third tour in Laos. 2008 
That took place in Washington. 2009 
Oh! 2010 
Yeah, Colby came, and I—at the—when he came, I was scheduled to come back, as I recall.  It 2011 
wasn’t until I get back to Washington, I guess when he then talks to [Richard] Helms, and they 2012 
both—or they decided that it was not such a good idea. 2013 
 2014 
(39:07)  Do you recall putting up any resistance to this idea that you should go, or were you 2015 
pretty well resigned to it by the time the case was made? 2016 
They phrased it in such terms that it wasn’t—there wasn’t going to be an argument from me.  It was 2017 
phrased in such a way that they—I was going to be relieved—period, and that the embassy request 2018 
for my return would be denied, and in fact I think it was a fait accompli by the time I get home. 2019 
 2020 
(39:46)  What do you remember about your last days in Laos? 2021 
Oh, very poignant. 2022 
How so? 2023 
Well, [Pauses] these were good people.  This is my graduate education—this was my education.  To 2024 
the extent that I know anything about how to deal with people, how to run things, how to [Pauses] 2025 
run myself, it was what those four years taught me.  [Long pause]  The ceremony, my closing 2026 
ceremony, they gave me a tailor-made Hmong suit that I still have, and can still get in.  And Bill Lair 2027 
was there, and Vang Pao, and I was able to stand up and give a speech in Lao.  And there were a lot 2028 
of tears.  Vang Pao held my hand and cried, called me his younger brother. 2029 
 2030 
(41:05)  I assume you made it clear to him that it was not your decision that you were 2031 
leaving. 2032 
Well, at that point I was just going home on home leave. 2033 
Oh, OK, that’s right. 2034 
But I think—I have a sense there must have been something in the wind.  But I was leaving, I 2035 
thought, for home leave, and I then I would come back.  And I think that’s basically what I said, that 2036 
‘I will return.’ 2037 
And yet you didn’t have a ceremony like this… 2038 
The first time around? 2039 
Yeah. 2040 
I didn’t even leave. 2041 
[Laughs]  Well, I guess there was no reason to have one, then. 2042 
No, I mean, this was… [Pauses] This was a very intense four years, and this was—you know, it was 2043 
every day, 24-seven.  And if you survived, there was no way this wasn’t going to leave a pretty 2044 
sizeable mark on you, and it does to this day.  And I don’t—it’s something I do not talk about.  I 2045 
mean, unless you come and have a specific reason, I—this is—this is very—in many ways very 2046 
private to me.  And also, of course, my life took a rather radical turn shortly thereafter, so in some 2047 
ways, when I leave the Agency and decide to go off and do what I really—I think is in my heart, that 2048 
I want to do, to a considerable extent I need to put as much as I can of the specifics of about Laos 2049 
behind me, if not the things that taught me as a human being. 2050 
 2051 
(43:20)  Now did Tony Poe even come back for this farewell and sort of pay his respects in 2052 
his own way? 2053 
I don’t think so.  [Interviewer laughs]  I don’t think so.  I’ll have to look.  There are photographs.  I 2054 
don’t remember Tony being there, but—you know, Tony, I think, and I, we sort of patched things 2055 
up toward the end.  I mean, I bore no grudge at all.  I think he was the one whose nose was properly 2056 
out of joint by my—by this upstart who just came in and kind of took things over from him. 2057 
 2058 
(43:59)  Do you remember any specific misgivings you might have had about how the 2059 
situation in Laos might evolve—not necessarily just because you were leaving, but because 2060 
of the way things seemed to be going? 2061 
[Pauses]  I had long talks when I came—Bill Colby was, I think both a very good friend and a very 2062 
good mentor, and I think, a man whose concern for the well-being of his officers under him was 2063 
probably his undoing as a director.  He cared too much about the people who he liked.  We had 2064 
long—his office was always open, and we would have long and really quite interesting talks about 2065 
my future life, and about the failure of the Brits and the Americans and anybody else to fully care for 2066 
and acknowledge the debt they owed to the people they hung out to dry.  And he—you know, he 2067 
had parachuted into Norway into World War II he was a very brave and honorable soldier.  But it 2068 
didn’t—that didn’t hide the fact that he thought the Brits had hung the Kachin and Karen tribes in 2069 
Burma—they basically handed them over to the Burmese at the end.  And he was very worried that 2070 
history was not a good guide as to what would happen to the Hmong.  [Long pause]  I’m not—I 2071 
remember just before—just when I arrived home, I briefed the new Station Chief, a guy named 2072 
Shackley… 2073 
 2074 
(46:28)  Ah, the infamous Ted Shackley. 2075 
Yeah.  And I had a very creepy suspicion about the man.  I hate—I disliked him from the moment I 2076 
met him, and nothing has ever changed my opinion since.  I think he was a dishonorable and venal 2077 
human being. 2078 
So plenty of reasons to worry very soon after your departure. 2079 
Yeah.  Bill always had the belief that the program as a whole was bigger then any one man’s 2080 
component in it, and that Shackley could not single-handedly destroy what four and a half years, five 2081 
years had done.  He may have been wrong, and I think he probably was wrong.  And Bill—I think 2082 
Ted Shackley and a change in ambassador—Mac Godley came in, and Godley wanted to get in bed 2083 
with the military, or was susceptible to their blandishments, if you will. 2084 
 2085 
(48:00)  You think Sullivan overall did a good job as ambassador?  2086 
Yes, Sullivan—personally, I think, did a wonderful job as ambassador.  He would come up country, 2087 
he and I would sit and talk.  I told him what I was doing, what I was hoping to do politically, 2088 
strategically, if you will.  He was—he liked to think of himself as a strategic thinker, and I think he 2089 
was.  And he and I got along very well.  In fact, when my brother published his memoirs…[Laughs] 2090 
He became somewhat of a parody of himself toward the end, ‘cause I think he kind of believed all of 2091 
his press clippings.  But he said some nice things about me.  And we—I had—I thought he was on 2092 
the right track, and I thought there was a—it may have all ended up in the same veil of tears. You 2093 
know, I’m not about to say that if they hadn’t done this and hadn’t done that, it all would have been 2094 
a success.  I think at the end, the Vietnamese were a whole lot stronger and a whole lot more 2095 
dedicated to doing what they were going to do than we were to stopping them.  So I’m not sure it 2096 
would have ended up ultimately any better.  I do think we could have left with a little more honor 2097 
than we did.  And if you listen to the Jiggs Weldon piece [Anne Garrels’ interview with Dr. Charles 2098 
Weldon on NPR], it’s the question of honor which really gets to some of the people who really care 2099 
about the place. 2100 
 2101 
(49:42)  Do you think the external fiction of—obviously there were plenty of people who 2102 
knew it was fiction—but do you think the external fiction of neutrality in any way tied the 2103 
hands of those who were trying to prosecute this Secret War?  Or do you think, given the 2104 
way you saw operating this war ideally, that it really wasn’t an impediment of any kind? 2105 
I think if you… [Pauses]  You do yourself a tremendous danger if you disregard a historical context 2106 
of a people.  And if you looked at the history of Laos as a people—whether it was three kingdoms, 2107 
one kingdom, you name it—it doesn’t make any difference.  Historically this is a group of people 2108 
who sit between two stronger neighbors, the Thai and the Vietnamese.  And their lot in life has been 2109 
historically to play a buffer between those two stronger entities.  Sometimes it’s the Vietnamese 2110 
coming in, now it’s the economic power of Thailand coming the other way.  I think the fiction of 2111 
the neutrality had some real value, [Pauses] because it allowed at least a continuity, if you will, of a 2112 
semblance of a country which, as we know, has never really existed.  But nothing else existed in 2113 
Laos, so why should the government be anything less?  It has never been a cohesive group of 2114 
people, and it probably—may never be.  And I think what we did—as a country, we did wrong was 2115 
this sort of belief that if we just got the correct right-wing general in there, he could make the 2116 
difference. 2117 
 2118 
(52:08)  Just like in Vietnam, right? 2119 
Just like in Vietnam. Phoumi Nosavan was just as corrupt, or Lon Nol in Cambodia, and I think all 2120 
of this was done, perhaps with good will and perhaps with good intentions, but the end result was… 2121 
[Pauses] you simply invited somebody else to go to the trough and steal as much as they possibly 2122 
could.  Phoumi Nosavan, I’m sure, was just simply an impossible human being to deal with.  He was 2123 
a French intellectual.  I mean, anyone dealing with a French intellectual is—you know, this is—you 2124 
don’t want to go there, particularly if the guy is head of a country!  But in some way, he was truer to 2125 
the historical role that Laotians played than almost anybody else.  It’s never going to be a strong left-2126 
wing country, it’ll never be a strong right-wing country—not in our era of time.  Maybe one day, but 2127 
not now. 2128 
 2129 
(53:22)  So do I understand you correctly from what you were saying earlier?  You left in ’66, 2130 
and then you spent ’66 to ’67 as Colby’s assistant— 2131 
Roughly, yes. 2132 
And it was during that period that you made ‘Journey from Pha Dong.’ 2133 
Yes. 2134 
So you were in Laos making the film? 2135 
No, I had made the—what I had done—I had started taking 16mm footage almost right from the 2136 
beginning.  I was kind of a photography bug, and then they sent John Willheim out—gosh, I don’t 2137 
know what years.  I would say ’64, ’65.  He was with us for almost a year.  And John was a bizarre 2138 
but wonderful human being. 2139 
 2140 
(54:11)  His photo collection is at the Center for Hmong Studies. 2141 
It is? 2142 
Yes. 2143 
You mean slides? 2144 
I don’t know that it’s all there, and it may not be the originals, but they have numerous—2145 
probably most if not all of his photographs. 2146 
Well that’s where I’ll send mine.  ‘Cause I have a huge collection of photographs.  So in effect, much 2147 
of the film, virtually all of the film was shot by the time I come home.     2148 
So when you said earlier that you worked for Bill Lair in the morning and then— 2149 
Bill Colby. 2150 
Oh, Bill Colby.  My mistake.   2151 
I worked— 2152 
I’m sure you just said Bill and I [Laughs] 2153 
No, I worked for Colby.  I was Colby’s special assistant in the morning, and then in the afternoon 2154 
and evenings, John Willheim and I fashioned the film together. 2155 
OK.  My mistake. 2156 
 2157 
(55:10)  Did you have any inclination or opportunity to sort of monitor what was going on in 2158 
Laos during the ensuing years? 2159 
Not really.  I was somewhat out of the loop, and I would sit in on the staff meetings and 2160 
read…[Pauses] because you see, of course, it isn’t clear…Let’s see, I come home in ’66, I work for 2161 
Colby from roughly July, then I get—oh gosh, do I get married?  Yeah, I meet an Austrian girl on 2162 
my way home, virtually.  [Pauses]  I’m married in ’67, in Austria, and I think that fall of ’67 I’ve 2163 
completed, in a year and a bit, I’ve completed the film, and I’ve taken Colby’s advice and I’ve 2164 
applied to go to the fall semester at Princeton to get the necessary undergraduate courses in 2165 
anthropology to apply.  I go to the Woodrow Wilson Center, and I spend the winter of ’67 at 2166 
Princeton, and I’m accepted by Chicago in the spring, and we’re ready to go to Chicago when I get 2167 
the call from Nitze, so I go back to Washington in ’67, and I worked for Nitze ’67, ’68.  The fall of 2168 
’68 Johnson chooses not to run, Nixon is elected, Nitze is out, so I am faced with going—I’ve had 2169 
an extended leave without pay from the Agency, and I’m faced with the idea—do I go back to the 2170 
Agency or do I go off and do what my heart has sort of been telling me for some time?  So I choose 2171 
to leave. 2172 
 2173 
(57:55)  Were you—it sounded like you wanted, as you said, to put your experiences in Laos 2174 
behind you for a time for, I’m sure, a number of reasons. Were you aware of the fall of Long 2175 
Cheng in ’75— 2176 
Oh, sure. 2177 
OK. 2178 
But I’m not aware, in the sense—because once you’re out, you’re out.  Things dry up real fast.  And 2179 
I don’t have the connections in the Agency any longer.  I don’t have the guy—my old friend that I 2180 
can call up at the desk and say, ‘What’s going on?’   I mean, my old friend is Lair, and I can’t reach 2181 
him anywhere.  So in ’75—you see, and I don’t think it’s clear—it’s not clear what the impact of the 2182 
militarization of Laos is until after I leave, really.  I mean, the first year, everybody dislikes Shackley, 2183 
but it’s not clear that this man is in the process of dismantling everything in his quest to become… 2184 
[Pauses]   So I’m—maybe it is clear, maybe if you went back you could see the signs, but I don’t see 2185 
them.  So by the time I leave I’m so focused on the sense that I’ve got to go find something that I 2186 
want to do for the rest of my life, so when I leave [Pauses] the Pentagon in the—oh, September, 2187 
December—or I guess after the elections in November [Pauses] I don’t think it’s absolutely clear 2188 
what’s happening. 2189 
 2190 
(59:59)  Did you ever see VP in the US? 2191 
[Yes].  When I worked for Colby, in the year and a half I worked for Colby, VP was wounded in the 2192 
arm, and he spent some time in the Tripler Army Hospital in Honolulu, and I went out and spent 2193 
time with him.  I saw him several times thereafter when the war was going on.  And when he came 2194 
out and went to Missoula, [Pauses] I and my father went out to visit him south of Helena.  And at 2195 
that point he was still full of the bravado of going back and the irredentist dreams of all that (***) 2196 
stuff.  I think I see—and I remember seeing him once in my house in Washington.  So I would say 2197 
three times, maybe four.  Not very often.  I’m not useful any longer, you see? 2198 
 2199 
(1:01:22)  But these were at least cordial visits— 2200 
Oh, very… 2201 
—in which you were happy to see each other, and… 2202 
Yeah, I was—very happy to see him. 2203 
 2204 
(1:01:31)  Well, I think you said you’d prefer not to answer this question, so I’ll just ask it and 2205 
you can say, ‘No comment.’  And that is, how do you feel your experiences in Laos have 2206 
affected you? 2207 
[Half-minute pause]  It taught me to try to be fair.  It taught me to try to be consistent.  It taught me 2208 
not to rely on anybody else, and do it yourself.  [Pauses]  And it taught me if you fuck up, you’d 2209 
better admit it.  [Interviewer laughs]   2210 
Always good advice.   2211 
Yeah.  [Later, as Lawrence is walking the interviewer to his art studio, he adds another lesson to the 2212 
list:  ‘Keep your head down.’] 2213 
More people should follow it.  2214 
 2215 
(1:02:58)  You mentioned that you went back to Laos in 1999. 2216 
[Yes] 2217 
What was the purpose of that trip, and what, if anything, came out of it that made you 2218 
reflect on that war and your experiences there? 2219 
The purpose of the trip was—came out of NPR [National Public Radio], who thought it would be 2220 
interesting if Anne Garrels took her old husband back to the scene of his earlier triumphs, and to 2221 
look at what had happened in the intervening 30 years.  It was in many ways remarkable.  Annie had 2222 
done some really good stuff out of Cambodia, where she had talked to a lot of the Khmer Rouge 2223 
people, and she was, as she is now, really, a superb reporter, and a great believer in oral history.  I 2224 
think, actually—and there’s a book I’ll give you—you should have, called Rules for Old Men Waiting.  2225 
Have you heard of that? 2226 
No, I don’t think I have. 2227 
It’s a marvelous book about—I liked it very much.  It has a lot to do with oral history.  [Pauses]  I 2228 
don’t think it turned out the way NPR or Annie thought it would, largely because there was no 2229 
way—it turned out there was no way for us to go back to Long Cheng and I could walk around 2230 
nostalgically like a grad student, saying, ‘Here’s where I did this, and this was old Hillier Hall, where 2231 
we used to snoggle down in the basement’—you know, all that kind of bullshit.  [Interviewer 2232 
chuckles]  So I mean, that whole kind of nostalgic thing, which is never something I really needed to 2233 
do or wanted to do anyway, was largely left off the table, off the plate.  What it did do—I think our 2234 
three days with Doc Weldon was very touching, largely because this was a man who had given far 2235 
more years of his life to the Hmong and to the people of Laos than I had, and this was a man who 2236 
was so deeply wounded and scarred, although, as I said, he lived an hour and a half away from Laos 2237 
itself, could never bring himself to go back.  He thought the behavior of America toward these 2238 
people bordered on the criminal.  And he said it with great compassion and great pain.  And it was 2239 
far better for Annie to get this on tape than it was for anything I could say.  As I think I mentioned, 2240 
the visit with Doc was very useful in the sense that it put us in touch with people in Vientiane who 2241 
were delighted to see us and spent many hours—as I had remembered Vientiane being.  You could 2242 
sit out on a patio overlooking the Mekong after a hot day and talk and drink wine, and pretty much 2243 
blow the whole evening away.  But there were some fascinating remnants of people who were doing 2244 
interesting things—I think I mentioned to you on the walk:  young lawyers from—half-Lao, half-2245 
American lawyers whose father had been in Laos, who were doing really important things for—in 2246 
their own way.  And the usual collection of people for whom Laos was a particular magnet that they 2247 
could never free themselves from—and there’s a lot.  Probably per capita there’s a lot.—I mean 2248 
there’s not very many in terms of actual numbers, but there is an entire community of people who 2249 
somehow got hooked on Laos at an early age, and then found the rest of the world was as 2250 
meaningless as anything else, and they decided, ‘Well, if I’m going to do a meaningless life, I might 2251 
as well go back and do it where it’s really—life is pretty nice and easy.  We had a—I look back on 2252 
that—we had a wonderful time.  Annie was gone quite a bit, doing pieces on—as I suggested:  one 2253 
looking for body parts on the Ho Chi Minh Trail with American teams, and also a really compelling 2254 
piece on the issue of unexploded ordinance, which is absolutely staggering.  Laos has the greatest 2255 
amount of unexploded ordinance of any country in the world, and it’s just—every plane coming 2256 
back from Vietnam who couldn’t drop their stuff in Vietnam dropped it in Laos.  So there’s a huge 2257 
amount of that.  And I was left somewhat to my own devices.  I went up to Luang Prabang, spent a 2258 
couple of days walking around painting and drawing, and then having long evenings with good folks 2259 
in Vientiane.  So in the long run, I found it a rather wistful and rather strange experience.  It wasn’t 2260 
the fact that I knew Vientiane very well, ‘cause I didn’t, but it had always stuck in my mind. 2261 
 2262 
[Interviewer checks recorder quickly to make sure it’s not running out of memory.  Final track 2263 
begins.] 2264 
 2265 
(0:00)  Well, I’ll try not to keep you forever.  I know you’ve been very indulgent.  Could you 2266 
recount, because we didn’t get this on the recording, when Bill Lair came here, and his stay 2267 
with you?  That was a particularly interesting story, I thought. 2268 
Well, I think I mentioned that when I left [Laos], I had boxes and boxes and boxes of material.  2269 
Mostly they were carbon copies of every message I had sent in four years.  And there was—as Annie 2270 
suggested, once you get me going, I [Interviewer laughs] I can talk or I can write.  And I thought, 2271 
actually, I had a lot to say.  We’ll let somebody else be the judge of that.  But I was extremely 2272 
worried about security and about my commitment to the Agency’s— maintain secrecy, so I basically 2273 
wrapped all the boxes up in very strong tape, sent them home, and in effect said, ‘I will not look at 2274 
this stuff for 25 years.’  And as it turned out, my life took several interesting and different turns, and 2275 
I really had forgotten pretty much all about them, and they were down in the stable, high on a shelf.  2276 
And when I turned 50, Annie thought it would be great if I got—if she brought Bill Lair up here for 2277 
a visit.  And it just so happened that that roughly coincided with my 25-year self-imposed 2278 
moratorium.  And I said to Bill, ‘Let’s—I think it’s time to open the boxes.’  And he said, ‘What 2279 
boxes?’ [Interviewer chuckles]  And I said, ‘Copies of every single message I ever sent to you.’  He 2280 
said— [Laughs]  He blanched, and [Interviewer laughs] I don’t know if he really—you know, be 2281 
careful of what you wish for.  So I brought them out, and he sat at this table, which at that point was 2282 
going perpendicular to where it is now, and he sat at this end, right down at that corner, and for—2283 
I’m not sure he slept for four nights.  He read everything—virtually everything that was in those 2284 
boxes.  And, of course, one morning I came down and he was particularly intent.  And I said, ‘What 2285 
are you reading, Bill?’  And he said, ‘I’m reading the diary of your—the night when I told you that 2286 
the CIA had chosen a wife for me. [Interviewer chuckles]  And he said, ‘You were a little harsh on 2287 
me.’  [Both laugh]  But he said—I said, ‘Well Bill, I was a young man.  I was sort of brought up on 2288 
romantic love and here you are telling me that you have a 25-year marriage with a girl who was 2289 
picked out of a CIA dossier for you.’  And he said, ‘Yeah, well of course, if you look at it that way, I 2290 
could understand that.’  But he said it had been a great—it had been a good marriage.  And I 2291 
think—as far as I know it was.  And it was at that point we thought—we had talked a lot about 2292 
trying to get the story out, and it was at that point—well, I’m not sure if Roger Warner was in the 2293 
picture at that point, or whether he came shortly thereafter.  I think actually Roger was.  [Pauses]  2294 
And Bill and I discussed it, and we thought that Roger was—we were very—we both believed that if 2295 
we couldn’t get the right person, it was better to let the stuff lay buried until the right person came 2296 
along—that we did not want—we didn’t want an exposé, we didn’t want—we wanted something 2297 
fair, we wanted something cohesive, and we wanted something that, at least to the best of that 2298 
writer’s ability, reflected what in fact had happened.  And Roger was pretty impressive.  We both 2299 
liked him.  If didn’t like him [right away], soon thereafter we both liked him.  [Pauses]  And so I said, 2300 
‘Bill, I think it’s time to let Roger have the boxes.’  And that’s what I did, with Bill’s blessing.  And I 2301 
think Roger’s—I think Shooting at the Moon, or Backfire, or whatever, I think has been [Pauses] a 2302 
worthwhile exercise. 2303 
 2304 
(5:15)  Very much so.  Absolutely. 2305 
I don’t think any of this… [Pauses]   You know, I don’t think any understanding of the Hmong 2306 
would be possible without his book. So [Pauses] I’m glad I broke the law, [Interviewer laughs] so to 2307 
speak. 2308 
As it were. 2309 
Yeah. 2310 
 2311 
(5:42)  What—obviously, I’m not trying to be too nosy, but considering that most of the stuff 2312 
that’s out there on the internet about you is ‘Laos, CIA, blah, blah, blah, and oh, by the way, 2313 
he’s an artist and married to Anne Garrels.’   2314 
Yeah. 2315 
What would you like people to know about this later and probably more rewarding period of 2316 
your life? 2317 
[Pauses]  Oh, not much.  [Interviewer laughs]  Well, you know, I—I’ll give you an example.  Annie’s 2318 
been on a huge problem with Wikipedia, because someone keeps posting on Wikipedia an utterly 2319 
fallacious story that she turned her armed guard unit, which follows her everywhere, firing at a 2320 
crowd of civilians in Baghdad.  [Interviewers gasps]  I never look—I have never looked, I have 2321 
never Googled myself, I have never looked at this.  I figure—I spent 30 years, roughly publishing 2322 
two drawings a week for 30 years.  If anyone wants to look at that, I’ll show them the result.  It ain’t 2323 
bad. I taught myself how to draw, I taught myself how to do…I never went to art school and it’s all 2324 
mine.  And at the age of 60 I thought I had enough balls to go off the cliff one more time. I didn’t 2325 
like what was happening at the New Republic.  I didn’t like the internal politics of the magazine.  I 2326 
didn’t like George Bush, but I didn’t like the New Republic’s incessant Israel-centric view of the 2327 
world.  And I thought—the one thing I worried about mostly was—people who are commentators 2328 
of one type or another end up at the end of their lives repeating themselves, and become parodies of 2329 
themselves.  And I thought the crucial thing in life was knowing when to quit.  And I thought, ‘Time 2330 
to quit, kid.  Go do something else.’  And so I started painting, and have been very happy doing it. 2331 
 2332 
(8:34)  Do you have a particular medium or a particular subject matter— 2333 
Well, I’ll show you. 2334 
Oh, I’d love to see some. 2335 
Yeah, I’ll show you.  We’ll go out in the studio, I’ll show you—well, I’ll give you a little tour. 2336 
 2337 
(8:45)  Well, with that, goodness know you’ve been more than generous with your time, and 2338 
more than indulgent with my silly questions, and I can’t thank you enough for inviting me 2339 
into your home—  2340 
It’s no trouble. 2341 
—and letting me hang out, and go walking with you and your dogs— 2342 
Anybody who wants—who I think—the crucial thing, what I judge is how serious the person is 2343 
who’s asking the questions.  And I’m not bad at spotting phonies.  And you’re not a phony.  I mean, 2344 
I don’t mind—you know, it’s a subject I like to talk about if somebody has done their homework, 2345 
which obviously you have, and somebody who’s truly interested, which clearly you are.  In that case, 2346 
I’m delighted to talk about it.  It’s just that I don’t need to talk about it to define who I am.  And 2347 
that’s really sort of—that’s sort of where it is.  And so I don’t—very few people know about all of 2348 
this, and largely because they don’t want to spend the time to listen to it all.  It’s a complex—and 2349 
clearly, there’s a lot of gray in it, and there’s a lot of nuance in it. 2350 
 2351 
(10:17)  Yeah, I still feel like a beginner. 2352 
Well, you’ll get there.  But the point is—I still go back to that same idea that it took me two years of 2353 
living it to know what the questions were.  It took me another two years to know conceivably what 2354 
the answers were.  I don’t—it has always been slightly interesting to me, is what I might have done 2355 
in the next two years.  But I didn’t get that chance.  So I don’t know. 2356 
 2357 
(10:59)  Well again, thank you very, very much. 2358 
You’re welcome. 2359 
 2360 
[Recorder is turned off, interview is concluded.] 2361 
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